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ABSTRACT
This paper documents the changes in the income distribution in Argentina from the 
mid-1970s to the mid-2000s. Over the period inequality increased substantially. Two
types  of  episodes  have  shaped  this  upward  trend:  deep  macroeconomic  crises  and 
periods of sudden and intense economic liberalization. The sizeable rise in inequality in 
the  1990s  seems  to  be  associated  to  reallocations  against  unskilled-labor  intensive 
sectors,  and  skilled-biased  technological  change  within  most  sectors,  both  factors 
stimulated by the process of economic integration. The depth and speed of the reforms 
and the scarcity of public policies to ease the transition contributed to the particular 
severity  of  the  income  distribution  changes.  The  macro  crises  and  the  subsequent 
recoveries contributed to the volatility of inequality along this upward trend. The large 
macroeconomic crisis of 2001/02 triggered a large jump in inequality, although income 
disparities returned to pre-crisis levels as the economy recovered fast, and large cash 
transfer programs were implemented.
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1. Introduction
Income distributions usually change slowly. As stated by Aaron (1978), following 
income  distribution  statistics is  frequently  “…like  watching  the  grass  grow”. In 
contrast,  since  the  mid  1970s  the  income  distribution  in  Argentina  has  shifted  in 
dramatic ways, implying statistically significant and economically large changes in all
indicators of income disparity. Following inequality in Argentina has been definitely 
more exciting than watching the grass grow.
To some extent, the dramatic increase in income inequality experienced by Argentina 
between  the  mid  1970s  and  the  mid  2000s  is  easy  to  understand.  The  country 
experienced in three decades most of the phenomena that are linked to increases in 
inequality  in  economic  theory: serious  macroeconomic  crises;  hyperinflation;  high 
unemployment;  repressive  dictatorships;  processes  of  deep  trade  liberalization; 
episodes  of  sudden  and  rapid  capital  accumulation,  technology  upgrading  and 
modernization;  weak  labor  institutions;  and  unequalizing  demographic  changes. 
Providing evidence on all these phenomena is, however, not easy, and it is even more 
problematic to gauge the relative relevance of each one as contributory factors to the 
increase in inequality. In the spirit of the project, this paper attempts to link these
factors  to  market  forces,  state  action,  socio-political  dimensions,  or  different 
combinations of these elements (Lustig, 2007).
This paper is first aimed at documenting the main patterns and trends of inequality in 
Argentina from the mid-1970s to the mid-2000s. Its second and most important aim is 
to critically assess the main hypotheses on the determinants of these patterns in the 
light of the existing empirical evidence. The paper combines a critical survey of the 
literature with new empirical evidence to provide an interpretation of the facts. It also 
identifies some of the remaining gaps to be filled for a better understanding of the 
changes in the income distribution over the period. This paper builds on some of the 
arguments  developed by  Gasparini  (2005a),  covering  a  wider  range of  issues  and 
interpretations, and providing a host of new evidence and a discussion of the 2001-
2006 episode of crisis and recovery. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main patterns and 
trends  of  income  distribution  in  Argentina  from  the  mid-1970s  to  the  mid-2000s. 
Section 3 provides a discussion of the evolution of the income distribution in terms of 
six distinct historical episodes. Section 4 explores the inequality changes in non-crisis 
episodes by means of micro-econometric and sectoral decompositions. Sections 5 to 7
discuss and assess the relative contribution of three of the main hypotheses in the 
debate  over  the  evolution  of  inequality  in  Argentina:  trade  liberalization, 
technological change, and structural adjustment. Section 8 covers other contributing 
factors for which there is scarce evidence. Section 9 investigates the distributional 
impact  of  social  spending  and  its  financing  through  the  tax  system.  Section  10 
discusses the macro crises, i.e. short episodes of serious macroeconomic turbulence 
associated to large jumps in poverty and inequality. Section 11 assesses the fall in 
indicators of income disparity after the crisis of 2001-2002 in light of the still scarce Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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available  evidence for  this  episode.  Finally,  section  12  provides  some  concluding 
remarks. 
2. Main trends in income inequality 
All the available empirical evidence strongly suggests that inequality in Argentina has 
substantially increased from the mid-1970s to the mid-2000s. Figure 2.1 presents a 
summary  of  this  disappointing  story:  the  Gini  coefficient  for  the  distribution  of 
household per capita income in the Greater Buenos Aires (GBA) area soared from 
0.344 in 1974 to 0.487 in 2006.
1 Other inequality indicators confirm this trend over 
the period: while the income share of the poorest quintile declined from 7.1 to 3.7, the
share for the richest quintile rose more than 10 percentage points, from 41.8 to 53.2, 
and the 90/10 income ratio increased from around  5 in 1974 to 11 in  2006. This
increase in inequality was not uniform over time. Figure 2.2 depicts short periods of 
relative calm, and episodes of rapid surge.
2
This trend in inequality is robust to the geographic coverage of the data source, to the 
choice of indicator and to methodological aspects regarding the underlying income 
variable, and it is also apparent in alternative data sources. Regarding the geographic 
coverage,  an  inequality  series  from  the  mid-1970s  can  only  be  estimated  for  the 
Greater Buenos Aires, an urban area containing around a third of Argentina’s total 
population.  However,  the  trends  described  in  the  previous  paragraph  can  be 
extrapolated  to  the  whole  urban  population.  Figure  2.2  suggests  that  inequality 
estimates for the aggregate of all large urban areas in Argentina do not considerably 
differ from those of the GBA. Unfortunately, the national household survey does not 
cover small cities and rural areas, but adding these areas would probably not modify 
the main aggregate results, since (i) inequality does not significantly change when 
comparing the EPH with results from the few household surveys that include rural 
towns  and  small  cities  (e.g.  Encuesta  de  Desarrollo  Social,  1997;  Encuesta  de 
Condiciones de Vida, 2001; Encuesta de Impacto Social de la Crisis en Argentina,
2002),  (ii)  disperse  rural  population  accounts  for  only  7.2  percent  of  Argentina’s 
population, and (iii) unlike several other countries in the region, most of the rural 
                                                
1 The microdata behind these figures come from Argentina’s main official household survey (Encuesta 
Permanente de Hogares, EPH), which covers the main urban areas of the country. The EPH started in 
the 1970s as a survey for Greater Buenos Aires (GBA), which accounts for one third of Argentina’s 
population,  and  was  gradually  extended  later  to  cover  all  urban  areas  with  more  than  100,000 
inhabitants.  The  appendix  provides  more  detailed  information  about  methodological  and  coverage 
aspects of the EPH. 
2 This volatility contrasts with the available evidence for the 1960s, based on more limited surveys and 
National Accounts,  which suggests a more stable income distribution. See CEPAL (1968), Altimir 
(1986) and Altimir and Beccaria (2001) for reviews of these early indicators. While stable over the 
1960s, the income distribution shifted substantially towards greater equality in the late 1940s and early 
1950s  during  the  Perón  administrations  (Gerchunoff  and  Llach,  2003).  Indicators  from  household 
survey data from that period are not available.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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population and its economic activities are highly integrated to the modern economy.
3
For simplicity, the rest of the paper sometimes refers to Argentina, although the data 
usually represents large urban areas from 1992 onwards, or the Greater Buenos Aires
for the previous years.
The upward trend in inequality in household per capita income over the period is also 
robust to the choice of indicator: the trend is reflected in the income ratios and shares 
of deciles in table 2.1, and in all the alternative indices in table 2.2. The confidence 
intervals for the Gini coefficient, presented in table 2.3, show that these large changes 
in  inequality  are  statistically  significant.  Moreover,  the  discussions  in  Gasparini 
(2005b, 2007) establish that this trend is robust to a host of methodological issues, 
including non-response, misreporting of income, inclusion of non-monetary income, 
inclusion of implicit rent from own housing, accounting for family structure through 
equivalization,  and  adjustment  for  regional  prices,  among  others.  As  discussed  in 
section 9, the trends are also similar when including or excluding the impact of social 
expenditure and taxes.
The trend in inequality can also be inferred from alternative data sources. Navajas 
(1999),  using  comparable  samples  and  baskets  for  the  1985-1986  and  1996-1997 
expenditure surveys, reports quintile-based Gini coefficients for the distribution of per 
capita expenditures of 0.33 and 0.38, broadly compatible with the trend in income 
inequality in figure 2.2. Inequality statistics can also be derived from administrative 
sources. Alvaredo (2008), using personal income tax data, estimates an increase in the 
top 1 percent income share from 7 percent in 1973 to 11.8 percent in 1997, and to 
12.3 percent in 2001. Galbraith et al. (2008) find a large increase in inequality among 
formal workers between 1994 and 2002, using microdata from the pension system’s
contribution records (Sistema Integrado de Jubilaciones y Pensiones). Finally, it is 
possible to complement indicators based on personal income with the distribution of 
income  among  the  factors  of  production,  which  can  be  inferred  from  aggregate 
national accounts. While the share of wages was around 45 percent in the early 1970s, 
the estimations for the mid 2000s range from 30 to 38 percent (Lindemboim et al., 
2005), suggesting again a substantial increase in inequality.
The transformations in Argentina’s income distribution are clearly depicted through 
graphs. The robust and large upward trend in inequality over the whole period is 
illustrated by the raise in the Gini coefficient in figure 2.2. Figures 2.3 to 2.5 reveal
some of the underlying trends.
4 Figure 2.3 shows a non parametric estimate of the 
density functions of the logarithm of household per capita income: the spread of the 
curves implies that the distribution became more unequal between 1992 and 2000. 
                                                
3  The  comparison  with  neighboring  Uruguay  is  illustrative.  This  country,  with  a  socioeconomic 
structure similar to some part of Argentina, has recently included rural areas in its household survey, 
with no major changes in the national inequality statistics. The national Gini is almost exactly the same 
as the Gini for the Greater Montevideo (CEDLAS, 2008). 
4 As in several other sections of this paper, the discussion of figures 2.3-2.5 focuses on the period 1992-
2006 for which data is available for urban Argentina (and not for GBA only).Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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Between 2000 and 2006, instead, the distribution seems to have changed its central 
position, but not its basic shape. The growth-incidence curves in figure 2.4 reflect 
large  and  non-neutral  income  changes.  Overall,  incomes  fell  over  the  1992-2006 
period for all centiles of the distribution, but the fall was larger for the poor. These
income dynamics imply an increase in inequality, which is reflected in the dominance 
of the Lorenz curves for the corresponding years in figure 2.5. 
The substantial increase in inequality has strong implications. The poverty headcount 
ratio in urban Argentina computed with the official moderate poverty line climbed 
from 18.5 to 26.7 between 1992 and 2006 (see figure 2.6). It is difficult to explain the 
substantial increase in poverty in Argentina without mentioning the worsening in the 
inequality  indicators.  The  impact  of  the  inequality  increase  on  aggregate  welfare 
(weighted growth) is also noticeable. Figure 2.7 suggests that aggregate economic 
welfare as measured  by  per capita  income was  10 percent lower in  2006  than in 
1992.
5 Evaluating welfare by mean income levels ignores all inequality concerns, and 
corresponds  implicitly  to  a  utilitarian  point  of  view.  For  any  observer  with  some 
degree of inequality aversion, however, the assessment of the economic performance 
in Argentina in the 1992-2006 period would be much worse. For instance, welfare 
associated with an Atkinson welfare function with inequality-aversion parameter of 2 
is almost 30 percent lower in 2006 than in 1992. The inequality aversion amplifies the 
10 percent fall in per capita income.
The  increase  in  inequality  in  Argentina  was  comparatively  large  by  international 
standards. Figure 2.8 depicts the changes in the Gini coefficients for countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean from the early 1990s to the early 2000s, and Argentina’s 
is among the largest. The comparison with the country’s neighbors is illustrative (see 
figure  2.9). Gasparini  et  al.  (2007,  2008)  report  that  the  gap  with  more  unequal 
economies, like Brazil or Chile, substantially shrunk in the last decades. Argentina’s 
once proud  “European”  income distribution,  with  a large  middle  class,  is  moving 
closer to “Latin American” levels of inequality.
Before proceeding with  the analysis, a methodological point  is  worth mentioning. 
Most of the evidence presented in this paper is based on the EPH, the main household 
survey in Argentina. As most surveys in the world, the EPH records labor incomes 
and cash transfers mainly, while it is weaker in capturing capital income, rents to 
natural resources and other sources of non-labor income. Moreover, as most surveys 
of its type, it fails to cover the richest households in the country, due to sampling 
reasons and non-response. These limitations certainly restrict our knowledge of the 
real level of inequality, and, more important, limit the assessment of the impact of 
policies and economic shocks beyond the distribution of personal income. 
                                                
5 Per capita GDP increased more than per capita income from the EPH, especially in the 1990s. In fact, 
per capita GDP was 27 percent higher in 2006 than in 1992. See Fernández and Kidyba (2005) for a 
discussion of these discrepancies. Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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3. An episodic story of inequality 
As stressed by Atkinson (1997), inequality changes can be analyzed from a long-term 
perspective, or by dividing time in episodes. Under the first approach one should fit a 
line from figure 2.2 and try to tell a story of why inequality has been increasing in 
Argentina from the mid-1970s to the mid-2000s, disregarding the ups and downs in 
the time series as perturbations from a clear increasing trend. Instead, as Atkinson 
(1997)  does  for  the  developed  world,  the  episodic  story  of  inequality  changes  in 
Argentina seems to be more compelling. The country has experienced strong shocks 
and policy changes that have affected the income distribution in different ways. Since 
the  logic  behind  the  inequality  changes  is  different  in  each  episode,  a  long-term 
perspective would  miss much of the action, and would probably be unhelpful  for
thinking about the future.
The first episode starts in 1974, since data from the EPH is available from that year
onwards, and the following 32 years are divided in six episodes (see table 3.1). The 
first episode covers the period from 1974 to the early 1980s, encompassing the last
two years of a democratic government and the whole dictatorial military regime. It is 
characterized  by  weak  labor  institutions,  with  almost  no  role  for  unions, by  a 
sweeping trade liberalization reform, and by sharp overall increase in inequality. The 
second episode comprises most of the 1980s, and it is characterized by the return to 
democratic  rule,  a  substantially  more  closed  economy, increased  union  activity, 
stronger  labor  institutions  (minimum  wage  enforcement,  collective  bargaining), 
macroeconomic instability, and a rather stable income distribution. The third episode 
corresponds to the serious macroeconomic crisis of the late 1980s that included two 
hyperinflations, and it is characterized first by a sharp increase and a consecutive
sudden fall in inequality after the successful stabilization in 1991. The fourth episode 
includes  most  of  the  1990s,  and it  is  characterized  by  relative  macroeconomic
stability
6, a currency board with an exchange rate fixed to the US dollar, and deep 
structural  reforms  which  implied  a  much  more  open  and  flexible  economy,  with 
weaker  labor  institutions.  The  income  distribution  during  the  1990s  became 
substantially more unequal. The recession that hit the country in the late 1990s and the 
ensuing macroeconomic  crisis in 2001-2002, with an economic meltdown and the 
devaluation of the currency, mark the fifth episode, again characterized by first a 
sharp increase in inequality, and then a substantial fall after the stabilization. The sixth
episode was underway at the time of writing, and started around 2004 with the rapid 
growth in the aftermath of the crisis. Its main characteristics include the adjustment of 
economic agents to the new relative prices introduced by the devaluation, stronger 
labor institutions and a more extensive safety net. Inequality fell to pre-crisis levels 
                                                
6 This stability refers mainly to the curbing of inflation, which was linked to the fixed exchange rate 
regime (currency board) set in place. The opening of the economy to capital flows implied a high 
degree of exposure to international fluctuations and to flow reversals, as witnessed by the impact of the 
succession of crises in Mexico, South-East Asia, Russia and Brazil. See the section on macro crises 
below for more details.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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over this period. Figure 3.1 reproduces the pattern of the Gini coefficient and GDP per 
capita marking the six proposed episodes. 
Like  any  other  modeling  exercise,  this  episodic  story  tries  to  highlight  the  main 
aspects from of a very complex stream of phenomena.
7 Table 3.1 characterizes these 
episodes in terms of five elements: (i) macroeconomic performance, (ii) openness to 
international trade, (iii) technological change and physical capital accumulation, (iv) 
unions  and  labor  institutions,  and  (v)  social  protection.  Naturally,  changes  in  the 
income  distribution  are  the  result  of  a  vast  array  of  factors,  so  any  simple 
classification excludes potentially relevant explanations. The five factors in table 3.1 
have two elements in common: they have close theoretical links with changes in the 
income  distribution,  and  they  have  been  extensively  invoked  in  the  distributional 
literature in Argentina.
The macroeconomic performance of Argentina has been characterized by low growth, 
and  high  volatility.  Table  3.2  provides  data  on  a  set  of  related  indicators.  The 
macroeconomic  performance  is  usually  associated  to  the  central  position  of  the 
income distribution, and hence to poverty. In contrast, its links to inequality are not 
unambiguous or well established in the economic literature, since it is not obvious that 
the benefits from growth (or the costs of recessions) are equally shared along the 
income distribution.
8 However, in most cases large macroeconomic crisis – in terms 
of high inflation and/or output and employment fall – are associated to unequalizing 
changes  in  the  income  distribution
9,  since  households  in  the  lower  end  of  the 
distribution have relatively less access to income smoothing and insurance devices. 
Argentina  suffered  two  large  crises from  the  mid-1970s  to  the  mid-2000s  with 
arguably large inequality consequences, which are covered in section 10. Moreover, 
some authors in Argentina also link the increase in inequality in the 1990s to the 
macroeconomic performance in that decade in terms of employment and aggregate 
demand. These arguments are discussed in section 7.
The  relationship  between  trade  and  inequality  has  long  been  a  key  issue  in 
Economics. The degree of openness of an economy is a crucial determinant of its 
price structure, and hence on the structure of employment and factor remunerations. 
The two periods of large increases in inequality in Argentina (besides the large macro 
crises) coincide with episodes of trade liberalization. More import competition might 
have induced a reduction in the relative demand for industries which were intensive in 
                                                
7 This episodic review is necessarily simplified, and some aspects, in particular the limits between 
episodes,  are  somehow  arbitrary.  The  reader  is  referred  to  Gerchunoff  and  Llach  (2003)  and  the 
references therein for a complete account of the period under discussion. Gerchunoff and Llach (2004) 
discuss equality and growth in Argentina from a longer term perspective. 
8  Bourguignon  et  al.  (2004)  present  case  studies  with  different  combinations  of  macroeconomic 
performance and the evolution of the income distribution.
9 The 1995 crisis in Mexico seems to be an exception. Székely (2005) reports that inequality actually 
fell between 1994 and 1996, because the reduction in income over all the population was largest among 
the richest households.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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unskilled labor, and thus increased overall inequality through increasing skill premia. 
Section 5 explores this issue in detail.
The  third  factor  in  table  3.1  combines  changes  in  production  and  organizational 
technologies, and physical capital accumulation. Both factors are usually associated 
with a bias towards skill labor, driving inequality in the labor market. The relevance 
of  this  hypothesis  for  Argentina  and  the  evidence  linking  the  large  increase  in 
inequality in the 1990s to a shock in the adoption of new technologies is discussed in 
section 6. 
Labor institutions encompass freedom of unionization, forms of collective bargaining, 
minimum wages, labor regulations, and other more subtle active labor market policies 
that reinforce the bargaining power of employees, mainly of unskilled workers. The 
literature in general agrees on the equalizing effect of these factors, at least in the 
short run, although the range of impact estimates is very ample. Section 8 discusses 
these arguments and the sketchy available evidence for the Argentine case.
Finally,  social  protection  affects  the  income  distribution  in  more  straightforward 
ways.  In  particular,  the  impact  of  cash  transfers  are  directly  reflected  in  income 
inequality  statistics.  However,  the  combined  incidence  of  all  items  of  social 
expenditure and of the taxes that finance them is not as clear. Section 9 shows that
social spending has affected the level but not the trend in income inequality.
The six episodes 
In March 1976, and by means of a coup d’état, a military regime came into power. 
Although, arguably, the first episode should start at that point, information from the 
EPH is available first for 1974, and then from 1980 onwards. Episode 1 thus starts in 
1974,  although  most  of  the  observed  distributional  changes  are  attributed  to  the 
developments  under  the  military  regime.  The  dictatorial  government  suspended 
collective bargaining, weakened unions (and targeted repression at lower level union 
leaders), weakened unions, undermined labor institutions, cut down social policies, 
and initiated a process of trade liberalization. In that framework, income disparities 
grew substantially: the Gini coefficient for the GBA rose from 0.345 in 1974 to 0.430 
in 1981. Poverty did not increase much, since the economy grew at an annual rate of 
1.3 percent per capita between 1976 and 1981. A banking crisis and a collapse of the 
exchange regime started a macroeconomic crisis in 1981, which was worsened by the 
debt crisis in many Latin American countries in 1982. This implied a dramatic closing 
of the economy (for instance, imports fell 50 percent in just 2 years) that initiated a 
new economic episode.
The economy remained rather closed from trade, financial markets and technological 
change in episode 2, even after democratic rule was restored at the end of 1983. Labor 
institutions  were  re-instated,  unions  regained their  power,  and  social  spending 
increased, although cash transfers remained low. The macroeconomic performance 
was  weak:  per  capita  GDP  did  not  grow  between  1982  and  1987,  and  inflation Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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remained high throughout the period. In this scenario, inequality remained stable but 
poverty increased.
Argentina entered a deep macroeconomic crisis in 1988 that peaked in 1989/90 with 
two hyperinflations, and ended around 1991 with the stabilization brought about by 
pegging the local currency to the US dollar (the Convertibility Plan, which established 
a currency board). The inequality dynamics in periods of large economic turbulences 
are  largely  governed  by  the  macroeconomic  situation.  Figure  3.1  shows  how  the 
evolution of inequality mirrors changes in per capita GDP in episode 3. While other 
policy factors were already at play (in fact, a new administration came into power in 
1989), they probably had a minor role in a period dominated by large macroeconomic 
fluctuations. 
Episode 4, which spreads over the 1990s, is clearly identified as a period of trade 
liberalization, intense capital accumulation and adoption of new technologies, weak 
labor institutions (lower employment protection, non binding minimum wages, among 
others), weak unions, and increasing although still low cash transfer programs. The 
Peronist  administration  implemented  a  large  set  of  structural  reforms  including 
deregulation, liberalization of trade and of capital markets, privatization of large state-
owned  enterprises,  the  demise  of  a  pay-as-you-go  pension  system  in  favor  of 
individual capitalization accounts, and several other market-oriented reforms. In that 
scenario the economy started to grow after two decades of stagnation, but inequality 
went substantially up: the Gini coefficient for urban Argentina rose from 0.452 in 
1992 to 0.507 in 2000. 
Policy  inconsistencies  (such  as  electoral  spending  and  debt  sustainability  issues 
related to the transition to the fully-funded pension system), the exhaustion of the 
currency  board  mechanism,  and  an  unfavorable  international  scenario deepened  a 
recession which started in 1999 and triggered a large crisis at the end of 2001. The 
crisis implied a large devaluation of the currency and the freezing of bank deposits,
and resulted in a dramatic fall in output and employment: per capita GDP fell 17
percent between 2000 and 2002, and unemployment climbed to 19 percent. The large 
devaluation implied a substantial fall in real wages. The economy hit bottom in 2002, 
starting to recover in 2003. Per capita GDP and the unemployment rate went back to 
their pre-crisis levels in 2004. Over this period, changes in inequality were dominated 
by the macro situation, as figure 3.1 suggests.
The post-crisis episode 6 was underway at the time of writing, so the paper only 
provides a preliminary assessment. The combination of several factors implied a fall 
in  inequality:  a  stable  and  growing  economy,  lower  import  competition  after  the 
devaluation, stronger labor institutions, and a more extensive safety net. Section 11
elaborates on these topics and discusses the preliminary evidence for this episode. 
The six proposed episodes can be classified into three types: (i) periods of serious 
macroeconomic crisis (episodes 3 and 5), (ii) periods of liberalization with weak labor 
institutions  (episodes  1  and  4),  and  (iii)  episodes  of  low  import  penetration  and Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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stronger labor institutions  (episodes 2 and 6). Inequality seems  to  have fluctuated 
widely  under  type-1  episodes,  increased  in  a  rather  permanent  way  under  type-2 
episodes, and decreased or remained stable under type-3 episodes. The next section 
provides an analysis of inequality over the period by focusing on non-crisis years. 
A word of caution is necessary before proceeding with the analysis. It is not easy to 
derive policy conclusions even from this stylized story, since it is very difficult to 
assess the long run general equilibrium effects of policies. A given combination of 
policies/circumstances may be associated to low inequality and poverty in the short 
run  but  may  be  substantially  contributing  to  a  future  crisis  under  which  all  the 
distributional improvements are undone. In that sense, the above classification, and 
the analysis that follows, is mostly descriptive.
4. Exploring inequality changes
This section discusses the results from decomposition exercises based on non-crisis 
years. The isolation from the crises allows assessing the relevance of direct factors on
the trend in inequality over the period. 
Microdecompositions
The first exercise consists of a microeconometric decomposition of the changes in the 
Gini coefficient for the distribution of hourly wages, earnings and household income. 
The methodology follows closely Gasparini, Marchionni and Sosa Escudero (2004). It 
requires the estimation of wage and hours of work equations at the individual level, 
and  the  use  of  the  resulting  coefficients  to  construct  counterfactual  distributions. 
Wages  and  hours  of  work  are  modeled  as  parametric  functions  of  observable 
characteristics, and the residuals of the regressions are interpreted as the effect of 
unobservable  factors.  The  basic  idea  of  these  microsimulations  is  to  find  the
counterfactual distribution of individual earnings that would be generated in a given 
period t1 if some of the determinants of earnings took the observed values in t2 and the 
rest remained at their values in t1. The difference between the real distribution in time 
t1 and the counterfactual characterizes the distributional impact of the factors modified 
in  the  simulation.
10 By  modeling  explicitly  the  wages  and  hours,  these 
microsimulations incorporate behavioral factors into the analysis, at the cost of having 
sometimes substantial unexplained residuals. Other methodologies bypass the issue of 
residuals by means of accounting decompositions based on identities, at the cost of 
not accounting for possible behavioral reactions from the agents (see the discussion in 
Paes de Barro et al., 2008). 
                                                
10 Since the outcomes are path-dependent, the tables corresponding to the microsimulations report the 
mean of the results obtained by changing the base year in each simulation.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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Table 4.1 shows the results for the Greater Buenos Aires area, the only region with 
information since 1980.
11 For each period, the table reports the actual change in the 
Gini  coefficient,  along  with  six  counterfactual  changes  corresponding  to  various 
simulated effects. Column (ii) shows the change in the Gini if only the returns to 
education on hourly wages (i.e. the coefficients of the educational dummies in the 
hourly wage equation) changed, keeping everything else constant. The change in the 
coefficients  of  education  in  the  hourly  wage  equation  has  a  direct  effect  on  the 
simulated  hourly  wages,  but  naturally,  also  affects  monthly  earnings,  and  hence 
household income. Table 4.1 shows the impact of each change on the distribution of 
these three variables. This effect has been large and equalizing in the 1980s, large and 
unequalizing in the 1990s, and much smaller in the 2000s. Figures 4.1 to 4.3 are
illustrative of the changes in the returns to education. The gap between primary school 
and  secondary  school  graduates  did  not  change  much.  Instead,  the  gap  between 
college  graduates  and  the  rest  fell  over  the  1980s  and  strongly  increased  in  the 
1990s.
12,
The increase in the payoff to education also took place in terms of hours of work. 
Figure 4.4 shows how the hours gap among educational groups changed sign in favor 
of the skilled: while in the early 1980s on average a 40 years-old male with only a 
primary  school  degree  worked  4  hours  more  than  his  counterpart  with  a  college 
degree, in the late 1990s he worked on average four hours less. Column (iii) in table 
4.1 reports the distributional impact of changing the coefficients of the educational 
dummies  in  the  hours  of  work  equation.  This  effect  was  particularly  large  and 
unequalizing during the 1990s. 
The wage gap between men and women increased in the 1980s, shrunk in the 1990s 
and has not  changed much  since then. The impact  of these changes on  the wage 
distribution has been of some importance (see column (iv)). However, the household 
income distribution has not been altered by changes in the gender wage gap.
Wages  are  determined  by  factors  included  in  the  regressions,  and  also  by 
unobservable factors that are jointly captured in the error term. Wage inequality may 
change if the dispersion in these unobservables changes (see Juhn et al., 1993). The 
increasing dispersion in the unobservables has been interpreted in the literature as an 
increase in the returns to some unobserved productive “assets” in the labor market, 
like ability, school quality, or connections. Figure 4.5 shows a sizeable increase in the 
                                                
11 It is difficult to extend the microsimulation to 1974, since the dataset for that year includes fewer 
variables. 
12 Manacorda et al. (2006) and Patrinos et al. (2005) use alternative definitions of skill premia (college 
with respect to high school, and high school with respect to primary for adult men only). They find an 
increase in the college premium with respect to the secondary level in the last two decades, and a fall in 
the premium for high school with respect to primary school. Sánchez-Páramo and Schady (2003) also 
find an increase in wages of university-educated workers in Argentina concurrently with increases in 
their relative abundance. The increase occurs mostly within sectors.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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standard deviation of the error term in the wage equations. This increase is reflected in 
the large distributional effects recorded in column (v). 
The  increase  in  inequality  in  the  1990s  occurred  simultaneously  with  an 
unprecedented  growth  in  unemployment.  The  unemployment  rate  jumped  from 
around 3 percent in the 1970s to 15 percent in the late 1990s in years of relative 
macroeconomic stability. Driven by the strong economic expansion and the increased 
coverage of employment programs after the 2001-2002 crisis, unemployment declined 
to around 10 percent by 2006. According to figure 4.6 the labor market was rather 
quiet  until  the  1990s,  when  two  combined  phenomena  implied  a  shock  to  the 
unemployment  rate:  a  significant increase  in  the  labor  participation  rate  (from  40
percent in 1990 to 46 percent in 1999), and a fall in the employment rate driven by the 
macro shocks and the adjustments after various structural changes (see the discussion 
in  section  8  below).  Nonetheless,  by  the  end  of  the  1990s  the  employment  rate 
recovered, meaning that most of the increase in unemployment rate can be accounted 
by  the  large  increase  in  labor  market  participation.  Women  and  youths  moved 
massively to the labor market but faced an economy with a rigid employment rate. 
Unemployment became even worse in recession times, when employment temporarily 
fell.
When  unemployment  is  mostly  the  consequence  of  increasing  labor  market 
participation, instead of falling employment, its effect on inequality or poverty is less 
obvious. If for instance a youth enter the labor force but is unable to find a job, the 
unemployment  rate  goes  up,  but  the  income  distribution  remains  unchanged.  The
direct distributional impact of these employment issues can be assessed by means of 
counterfactual distributions derived from changing the coefficients of the educational 
dummies in a labor participation equation. As reported in column (vi) of table 4.1, this 
employment  effect  has  been  small  even  during  the  period  of  increasing 
unemployment. As discussed,  this  exercise provides just  an estimate of the  direct
effect of changes in the extensive margin of the labor market. Section 8 elaborates on 
the possible indirect effects of a higher unemployment rate on wages. 
Finally, column (vii) in table 4.1 indicates that changes in the educational structure of 
the population were somewhat unequalizing over the period. This result reflects the 
expansion of the group of college graduates, with high levels of within-group wage 
dispersion,  and  average  earnings  much  higher  than  the  overall  mean.  This  latter 
characteristic generates a Kuznets-curve-like effect: as the size of a small group with 
high income increases, inequality initially grows.
Summing  up,  inequality  in  hourly  wages  and  earnings  diminished  in  the  1980s 
(ignoring  the  macro  crisis  of  the  late  1980s),  driven  by  a  fall  in  the  returns  to 
education in terms of hourly wages. Instead, during the 1990s the returns to education 
became highly unequalizing. The overall effect of returns to education accounts for 
4.6 points out of the 8.4 increase in the Gini for the equivalized household income 
distribution.  The  increase  in  the  returns  to  unobservable  factors  adds  another  1.5 
points.  These  results  suggest  that  unskilled  workers  – both  in  terms  of  formal Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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education and in terms of unobservable factors – lost in terms of hourly wages and 
hours of work during the 1990s, and that these changes had a very significant role in 
shaping the distribution of hourly wages, earnings, and household income. Any story 
of  inequality  changes  in  Argentina  should  pay  particular  attention  to  this 
phenomenon. Finally, the 1998-2006 comparison reveals a small drop in inequality 
that is mostly unexplained by the decomposition. 
Supply factors
In  a  typical  simple  equilibrium  model  the  wage  gap  between  the  skilled  and  the 
unskilled is driven by changes in their relative supply and demand. The skill premium 
may widen if  the  relative  supply  of  skilled  labor  falls. Although  there  have  been 
mentions of this possibility in the discussion in Argentina, referring to the increasing 
migration  of  unskilled  workers  from  neighboring  countries,  the  statistics  instead 
reveal a strong increase in the relative supply of semi-skilled (high school graduates) 
and skilled (college graduates) workers, to the detriment of those with lower levels of 
skills (those with less than a high school degree). Table 4.2 shows that while 78.6
percent  of  adults  aged  20  to  65  were  unskilled  in  GBA  in  1974,  that  share  fell 
significantly to  47.1  percent in  2006.  The share  climbed from 17.6 percent to  37
percent for  the semi-skilled,  and from 3.8  percent to  15.9 percent for  the skilled. 
These patterns, valid also for all urban Argentina (CEDLAS, 2008), are even more 
pronounced when considering the share in employment or in aggregate labor (total 
weighted hours of work), which reflects the increasing difficulties for the unskilled in 
the labor market.
Given  this  strong  increase  in  the  relative  supply  of  college  graduates,  the  wage 
premium would have been bound to fall if factor demands had not changed. This in 
fact appears to have happened in the 1980s, but not in the 1990s. Instead, in that 
decade  the  college  wage  premium  jumped  up,  which  suggests  an  increase  in  the 
demand for skilled workers which more than offset the downward pressures from the 
increased supply, especially for college graduates. Before turning in the following 
sections to factors behind the expansion in the relative demand for skilled workers,
what follows explores changes in employment and factor intensity across economic 
sectors. 
Sectoral changes
Argentina’s economy experienced large changes in its productive and employment 
structure over the period under study. Table 4.3 reports the shares in aggregate labor 
(efficiency hours of work multiplied by number of workers) by economic sector in 
Greater Buenos Aires since 1974.
13 The main patterns are illustrated in figure 4.7. The 
                                                
13 As mentioned above, data for a long period of time is only available for GBA, so some of the 
changes documented below could be the consequence of geographic changes of economic activities Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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most noticeable change in the labor structure since the 1970s has been the fall in 
employment in the manufacturing industry, and the increase in skilled services (public 
sector  and  professional  and  business  services).  While  in  1974  39  percent  of 
employment was in the manufacturing industry, the value dropped to just 17 percent
in 2006. On the other hand, while in 1974 21 percent of employment was in the more 
skilled-intensive sectors of professional and business services and the government, 
that share rose to 41 percent in 2006. These patterns do not vary substantially when 
dividing the population of workers by skills. 
With skilled-biased technological change, the increase in the stock of more educated 
workers can be easily absorbed in each sector. Instead, with constant technologies of 
production, an increase in skilled labor can be accommodated by either (i) a relative 
growth of the sectors intensive in skilled labor, with no changes in the intensity of 
factor use, or (ii) an increase in the use of skilled workers in unskilled tasks. Table 4.4 
is consistent with a strong increase in the intensity of use of skilled labor in most 
sectors of the economy. This skill upgrading in production processes was particularly 
strong in basic and high tech manufacturing sectors, but also in commerce and public 
administration.
To further explore the potential distributional impact of changes in employment, table 
4.5 presents an update of Gasparini’s (2005a) decomposition of changes in the share 
of each type of labor in total aggregate labor. Formally, the table reports:







































where N is labor input (number of workers multiplied by efficiency hours of work), i
indexes the type of labor (unskilled, semiskilled, and skilled), s indexes the economic 
sectors, and t indexes time. The first term of the decomposition (the “between” effect) 
captures the impact of transformations in the sectoral structure of employment on the
relative employment of factor i (e.g. due to changes in the production structure driven 
by trade liberalization). The second term (the “within” effect) captures changes due to 
variations in the intensity of use of different types of labor within each sector (e.g. due 
to biased technological change).
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The  results  of  the  decomposition  are  shown  in  table  4.5.  Changes  across  sectors
benefited the skilled over time. The between effect for college graduates is always 
positive. Instead, the unskilled suffered from employment reallocations against sectors 
that use unskilled labor more intensively. The numbers in the second panel of table 
4.5 suggests that the changes within sectors implied the use of more skilled labor. The 
                                                                                                                                           
and  employment  across  regions.  However,  Gasparini  (2007)  reports  that  changes  in  GBA  follow 
closely those in all urban Argentina since 1992.
14 See Bound and Johnson (1992) among others for similar decompositions.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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highest within effect for college graduates is for the 1990s, a fact consistent with the 
story  of  capital  incorporation  and  skilled-biased  technological  change  after  the 
reforms. It is interesting to notice that figures in the second panel are generally higher 
than those in the first panel, suggesting that within effects have been stronger than 
between effects. 
While  the 1990s  are characterized  by a  stronger  positive  within  effect  on college 
graduates, and an overall poorer performance of the semi-skilled, the 2000s present
smaller gains for the skilled both in terms of between and within effects, and present 
also  better  results  for  the  semi-skilled.  In  contrast,  the  unskilled  continued  losing 
ground in the labor market as in the previous decades. The following sections account 
for  some  of  the  plausible  factors  behind  the  evolution  of  skill  intensity  and 
remunerations in the labor market. 
5. Trade liberalization
While Argentina has witnessed a series of reforms in almost all aspects of economic 
life  over  the  mid-1970s/mid-2000s  period,  most  of  the  literature  highlights  trade 
liberalization as one of the key factors behind the increase in income inequality. This 
is partly due to the constraints on data availability for testing competing hypothesis, 
although this strand of research is also motivated by the salience of trade in the debate 
on increasing returns to skills in developed economies (Katz and Autor, 1999). 
The conventional wisdom in economic theory and some policy circles seemed to be 
that unskilled labor, the relatively abundant factor in developing economies, would 
benefit from trade reform, and thus inequality would fall (Perry and Olarreaga, 2006). 
However, as documented by the thorough reviews by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004, 
2007), reality seldom corresponded to this “naïve view” of the equalizing impact of 
trade reform in  developing countries  for a host  of reasons described below.  As a 
middle income country, the case for Argentina was not clear-cut ex ante, especially
since the country’s relative abundance might correspond to natural resources, which 
are complementary to capital and skilled labor, and not to unskilled labor
15 (Keifman, 
2006; Perry and Olarreaga, 2006). For countries with relatively complex productive 
                                                
15 The relevant factors of production and trade partners that determine Argentina’s relative abundance 
in the international trade arena is not a settled issue, and it is well beyond the scope of this paper. While 
Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003) argue that, compared to major trade partners like the U.S. or the E.U., 
Argentina is abundant in unskilled labor, Galiani and Porto (2008) state that Argentina is well-endowed 
in skills relative to other countries in Latin America with which it trades, and also when compared to 
the rest of the developing world, especially relatively new trading partners such as China. The trends in 
international  trade  in  the  mid-2000s,  however,  seem  also  to  suggest  that  Argentina’s  comparative 
advantage is the abundance of high quality land and other natural resources. For Perry and Olarreaga 
(2006), the relative factor endowment of Latin American countries might have shifted from unskilled 
labor to natural resources with the growing weight of India and China in international trade. Cristini 
(1999) and Keifman (2006) consider Argentina a country abundant in land and skilled labor, while 
Berlinski (1994, cited by Galiani and Porto, 2008) shows a specialization in natural resources and 
skilled labor when Argentina is compared with Brazil, its major partner within the region.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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structures  and  trading  patterns,  the  impact  of  trade  liberalization  on  the  income 
distribution is ultimately an empirical question.
The evidence for Argentina suggests overwhelmingly that trade liberalization led to
an increase in inequality. Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003) were among the first to find 
evidence of an unequalizing  effect of trade  reform. Using data from EPH  for the 
Greater Buenos Aires region for most of the 1990s, one of the two periods of trade 
liberalization  in  Argentina,  they  regress  the  log  of  individual  hourly  wage  as  a 
function  of  variables  that  interact  education  with  import  penetration  in  the  sector 
where the individual works, and a set of controls. They find that in sectors where 
import penetration was deeper, the wage gap between skilled and unskilled became 
wider.  While  according  to  this  evidence  the  trade  reforms  of  the  1990s  were  a 
contributing factor in the increase in inequality, Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003) state 
that this factor can explain only 10 percent of the total change in the wage premium.
16
Cicowiez  (2002)  reached  similar  conclusions  with  a  different  methodology.  He 
simulated the fall in tariffs during the liberalization process of the early 90s using a 
computable  general  equilibrium  model,  and  he  also  finds  a  small  unequalizing 
effect.
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While  most  of  the  studies  on  trade  and  inequality  have  concentrated  in  specific 
episodes (the short-lived liberalization of the 1970s in the earlier literature, and the 
reforms of the 1990s more recently), the study by Galiani and Porto (2008) covers the 
whole period 1974-2001, spanning five of the six “episodes” in the story of section 3, 
with consecutive periods of protection and liberalization (see figure 5.1 for a time 
series of the average tariff and the average skill premium in their data). Instead of 
using import penetration as in Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003), the authors avoid the 
potential  endogeneity  bias  of  this  variable  by  focusing  on  the  effect  of  industry-
specific  tariffs  on  wages  and  skill  premia.  Their  main  conclusions  are  that  trade 
liberalizations  reduce  wages  and  that  reductions  in  industry  tariffs  increase  the 
industry skill premium. Their results indicate that the level of tariffs has a positive and 
significant effect on the wages of unskilled labor, no significant effect on semi-skilled 
(high  school  graduates)  labor,  and  a  negative  impact  on  the  returns  to  higher 
                                                
16 Throughout this section, changes in the skill premium are associated with wage inequality, which in 
turn is assimilated to increases in overall income inequality. This can be justified by the overwhelming 
weight  of  labor  income  in  household  total  income,  and  by  the  similarity  in  movements  between 
inequality in hourly wages, earnings and equivalized income, especially since the 1990s (see table 4.1). 
Moreover,  while  trade  liberalization  might  also  have  a  long  run  effect  on  growth  and  thus  affect 
household  income  through  this  channel,  the  supporting  evidence  in  this  respect  is  still  elusive 
(Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). 
17 There seems to be a difference in the conclusions between the studies that analyze actual policy 
changes and those that simulate  the complete removal of trade barriers. For instance, Barraud  and 
Calfat  (2006)  use  a  two  sector  model  and  microsimulations  based  on  EPH  data  to  postulate  a 
hypothetical complete liberalization. They find that such a measure would increase household welfare 
and reduce poverty and inequality. Vos et al. (2006) report the results from a CGE model for Argentina 
in which poverty declines in a unilateral trade liberalization scenario, because the increase in the skill 
premium is compensated by offsetting positive employment effects. Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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education. Taken together, this evidence implies that the trade liberalization episodes 
increased skill premia and thus contributed to  higher overall income inequality in 
Argentina.
Most of the studies on trade and income distribution in Argentina have concentrated 
on wages and some measure of tariffs or imports. However, trade may modify the 
distribution of real income by changing not only factor remunerations, but also prices 
of goods and services. Porto (2002) represents one of the few efforts to account for 
the distributional effects of trade reforms through variables other than wages. He finds 
an equalizing distributional effect of a specific trade reform (the implementation of 
the MERCOSUR regional trading block in the early 1990s) from the consumption 
side by inspecting changes in relative prices and the bundles consumed by households 
from  an  expenditure  survey,  the  Encuesta  de  Gastos  e  Ingresos  de  los  Hogares
1996/7. He finds that the poor consume relatively more tradable goods than the rich, 
and  concludes  that  they  were  the  main  beneficiaries  of  the  fall  in  tariffs  when 
considering only this channel. While it is likely that the earnings inequality effect 
prevails, these results point out some of the limitations of the studies concentrating 
only on the impact of trade on wages.
The  general  conclusion  from  the  studies  on  the  distributive  impact  of  trade 
liberalization in Argentina is that, while more openness implied a wider wage gap and 
thus higher levels of overall inequality, its effects can only explain a relatively small 
fraction of the total increase in the wage premium. 
Some of the clues about the plausible concurrent factors behind the large increase in 
income inequality in Argentina during the 1990s can be derived from the extensions 
to the standard trade model incorporated by the liberalization and inequality literature. 
Many of the arguments (and, indeed, the evidence from country studies) point towards 
the importance of technology and capital accumulation (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2004, 
2007). The  next  section  discusses  the  issues  of  skill  biased  technological change, 
which  might  arise  endogenously  from  increased  trade, and  the  incorporation  of 
technology through the process of capital accumulation, which might have occurred 
concurrently to trade reform in Argentina. 
6. Technological change and capital incorporation
A complementary explanation for the large fall in the relative demand for unskilled 
workers relies on the importance of skilled-biased technological change (SBTC) and 
capital incorporation. The arguments are simple and have been formalized elsewhere 
(see Krusell  et al.,  2000,  Acemoglu, 2002 and  Card and Di  Nardo, 2006,  among 
others).  Technological  and  organizational  changes  that  increase  the  relative 
productivity of skilled workers translate into wider wage gaps, and, with labor market 
rigidities, also into lower employment for the unskilled. An increase in the use of 
physical capital in the production process becomes unequalizing through two channels 
First,  if  capital  goods  incorporate  embedded  technological  change,  an  increase  in Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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investment  in  new  machinery  and  equipment  can  accelerate  the  adoption  of  new 
technologies. Second, even without technical innovations, physical capital is usually 
more  complementary  to  skilled  labor,  being  then  a  source  for  an  increasing 
productivity gap across workers with different education levels. The arguments seem 
compelling  but it  must  be  established  whether  these  changes  have  taken  place  in 
Argentina, and if so, what has been their impact on inequality. The rest of this section 
tackles these points. 
A shock in physical capital, technology and organization 
Since the middle of the twentieth century and until the mid 1970s, Argentina was a 
relatively  closed  economy  with  low  investment  rates.  The  political  turmoil  of the 
1970s and the stagnant, unstable and protected economy of the 1980s discouraged 
investment in physical capital, especially foreign investment. A new scenario emerged 
in  the  1990s,  combining  macroeconomic  stability,  and  a  set  of  market-oriented 
policies,  including  a  massive  process  of  privatizations  and  deregulations,  and 
measures toward capital account liberalization. On top of that, the real exchange rate 
appreciation and the large tariff reductions substantially reduced the relative price of 
physical  capital  (figure  6.1).  The  favorable  international  financial  conditions  also 
contributed to the massive inflow of foreign capitals. 
Private investment as a proportion of GDP increased 44 percent between the 1980s 
and the 1990s. In particular, foreign direct investment as a share of GDP increased 
from an average of 0.4 percent in the period 1970-1990 to 1.6 percent in the period 
1991-1997.  According  to  FIEL  (2002),  the  physical  capital  stock  (excluding  the 
public sector) grew by 20 percent between 1992 and 1999. The average age of the 
capital  stock  decreased  from  8.8  years  in  1989  to  5.2  years  in  1998.  This  rapid 
increase in physical capital, particularly of imported machinery and equipment, was a 
vehicle of technology modernization after decades of backwardness. 
The  deregulation  of  many  domestic  markets  and  the  removal  of  barriers  to 
international trade forced private firms to seek the productivity gains necessary to stay 
in  business.  Besides,  the  openness  of  the  Argentine  economy  occurred  just  in  a 
moment  of  increasing  globalization  and  diffusion  of  new  communication  and 
information  technologies,  inducing  firms  to  adopt  state-of-the-art  production 
technologies.  Many  sectors  went  through  radical  changes  in  their  production 
processes,  incorporating  information  technology,  computers,  robots  and  modern 
assembly lines in just a few years.
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Changes did not take place only at the production stage, but also at the organizational 
level. The scenario described above contributed to an extraordinary transformation in 
the property structure of firms from public to private, from domestic to foreign, and 
                                                
18 See Bisang et al. (1996), Kosacoff (1998), Katz (2000) and Bisang and Gómez (2006). Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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from small to large owners. Morley et al. (1999) construct indices of reforms in Latin 
America and rank Argentina first in terms of the number and size of privatizations. 
Chudnovsky et al. (2004) constructed a database of firms in the country and found 
that more than 50 percent of those founded before 1975 changed ownership, most of 
them  in  the  1990s,  and  in  most  cases  with  the  involvement  of  transnational 
corporations  (TNC)  in  the  acquisition.  They  also  report  that  the  share  of  TNCs 
affiliates in the sales of the 1000 largest Argentine firms increased from 39 percent to 
67  percent  between  1992  and  2000.  Kosacoff  (1999)  and Azpiazu  et  al.  (2001), 
among others, document the surge of large domestic corporations in place of small 
firms. This new structure favored changes toward larger production scales (e.g from 
small shops to large supermarkets), and toward a more efficient use of production 
factors (e.g.,  eliminating  the excess  of  workers  in  public firms –  see  Galiani  and 
Sturzenegger’s 2008 discussion of privatization in section 8 below). 
Both technological and organizational changes implied a lower relative demand for 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers. The impact on these workers could have been 
milder  if  changes  had  been  adopted  gradually,  or  in  a  context  of  strong  social 
protection with compensatory measures. That was not the case: the modernization of 
Argentina’s  economy  took  place  in  just  a  few  years  in  a  scenario  of  weak  labor 
institutions, and in the midst of a process of labor deregulation (see section 8). It is 
also interesting to notice that the dramatic fall in the relative demand for unskilled 
labor, which quickly translated into unemployment, informality and poverty, did not 
unleash significant labor and social unrest during the 1990s. This may be due to the 
fact that changes occurred under a Peronist administration with high initial support
(Acuña et al., 2007), which had a noticeable success in the control of inflation, and 
which had managed successfully to establish an implicit alliance with the powerful 
unions.
The evidence 
Technology and organizational changes are difficult  to  measure, and in Argentina 
they occurred in a period with several policy changes and economic shocks. As in the 
rest of the world, the evidence in favor of these hypotheses is mostly indirect – it is 
not easy to identify causal links. 
One of the main arguments in favor of the technological change explanation is the 
difficulty to find alternative plausible hypothesis to account for the co-movements of 
relative wages and skill intensity. As documented in section 4 above, there was a 
substantial increase in the wage premium in the 1990s alongside an increase in the 
relative use of skilled labor across all economic sectors. This observation is hard to Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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reconcile with the predictions of most models that ignore skill-biased technological 
change.
19
The sectoral decomposition of changes in the share of employment by educational 
groups carried out in section 4 suggests that the fall in the relative employment of 
unskilled labor is mainly accounted for by a drop in the intensity of use of this factor 
within all economic sectors. This “within” effect is particularly relevant in the period 
1992-1998, which is consistent with the story of technological/organizational shock in 
the 1990s. García Swartz (1998) shares this conclusion, although his analysis covers 
just the beginning of the reforms. 
The  changes  in  the  returns  to  education  and  unobservable  factors  documented  in 
section 4 are also compatible with the SBTC/capital accumulation hypothesis. First, in
Argentina both the returns to observed and unobserved skill substantially increased in 
the 1990s (and not in the 1980s), a fact that is consistent with a technological shock 
driving changes in both returns. This experience differs from that of some developed 
countries where both returns did not grow at the same time, casting some doubts on 
the SBTC hypothesis.
20 Second, the change in the returns to education in Argentina 
implied that college graduates progressively departed from the rest, without any clear 
change in the gap between the unskilled and the semi-skilled. This is compatible with 
a pattern where a new technology is strongly complementary of non-routine cognitive 
tasks, typical of highly skilled workers, and mostly a substitute for the routine tasks 
found in many traditional middle-wage jobs, like those in the manufacturing sector 
(Autor,  Katz  and  Kearney,  2006).  Demombynes  and  Metzler  (2007)  find  that  the 
increase  in  the  dispersion  in  the  bottom  half  of  the  wage  distribution  in  urban 
Argentina can be almost fully accounted by a surge in the residual variance. Having 
secondary education does not imply any significant advantage to benefit from most 
new technologies, and hence returns to education did not increase. Instead, having 
other skills related to a more modern and competitive environment (but not observed 
by the researcher) could have become crucial.
Acosta and Gasparini (2007) present evidence for the relationship between capital 
accumulation and the wage structure by taking advantage of the variability of wage 
premia and capital investment across industries in Argentina’s manufacturing sectors. 
They  used  repeated  cross  sections  to  estimate  a  model  of  the  log  wage  on  the 
interactions between education and capital accumulation over gross value added for 
the sector where the individual works. The regression includes several controls and 
interactions  between  education,  import  penetration  and  exports.  The  estimated 
coefficients, presented in table 6.1, reveal that sectors that accumulated more physical 
capital in the 1990s were those where the wage premium grew the most. 
                                                
19 Explanations based on skilled workers performing unskilled tasks, that are consistent with these co-
movements, are treated in section 7.
20 See Demombynes and Metzler (2007) for more evidence on this point.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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Using  a  technology  survey  with  longitudinal  data  (Encuesta  sobre  la  Conducta 
Tecnológica de las Empresas Industriales Argentinas, ETIA), Bustos (2006) assesses
the impact of trade and foreign investment on technology and skill upgrading at the 
firm level. By applying decompositions similar to those in section 4, the paper shows 
that aggregate skill intensity in the manufacturing sector is almost entirely accounted 
for  by  skill  upgrading  within  firms.  Moreover,  the  paper  shows  that  firms  that 
upgraded  technology  faster  also  upgraded  skill  faster.  The  estimated  coefficients 
(shown in table 6.2) imply that a one standard deviation in the change in average 
spending in technology per worker is associated to a 0.629 percentage points increase
in skill intensity, which represents 30 percent of the average increase for the sample.
In related research based on data from EPH, Brassiolo et al. (2006) highlight the rapid 
adoption of information technologies in Argentina in the 1990s and find a substantial 
wage premium for the use of personal computers in the job.
As discussed in section 5 the direct effect of trade on wage inequality seems to have 
been small. However, as argued above, it is likely that the profound trade and capital 
account  liberalization  process  was  key  in  fostering  the  rapid  adoption  of  new 
technologies  through  various  channels.  Yeaple  (2005),  for  instance,  develops  a 
theoretical model where increased export opportunities could stimulate the adoption 
of new skill-biased technologies, which is compatible with Bustos’ (2006) findings 
for Argentina: firms that were most affected by trade liberalization, and firms which 
ventured into exports, upgraded skill faster than the rest. Moreover, the relative prices 
of  the  1990s  also  facilitated  capital  adoption: the  fixed  exchange  rate,  at  a  level 
considered by many to result in an overvalued currency, also implied a fall in the 
relative  price  of  imported  capital  (machinery  and  computers).  Recent  theoretical 
developments also point towards the endogeneity of technology adoption with respect 
to  trade.  Acemoglu  (2003)  develops  a  model  in  which  developing  countries 
incorporate technological change through the import of machines and capital goods
which are complementary to skilled labor. Atolia (2007), in turn, develops a dynamic 
Heckcsher-Ohlin model in which increasing inequality arise from trade liberalization 
in the short term because of asymmetric speeds of adjustment between the export and 
import  sectors.  The  asymmetry  generates  a  transitory  capital  accumulation  that 
increases  the  relative  wages  of  skilled  workers  because  of  capital-skill 
complementarity in production. This model reconciles the basic trade model with the 
evidence  from  developing  countries,  and  it  predicts  that  despite  these  short  term 
dynamics the Heckcsher-Ohlin effects prevail in the long run.
The greater relevance of the capital/technology and trade/technology channels over 
the “pure” trade channel is also found in studies for other countries. In a survey of the 
literature for the United States, Katz and Autor (1999) conclude that trade explains 
around 20 percent of the increase in inequality, while skilled-biased technological 
change explains  the remaining 80  percent.  Behrman et al.  (2003)  combine  policy 
indices with household survey microdata on wage differentials by schooling levels for 
18  Latin American countries for the period 1977-1998, and find that, on average,Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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liberalizing  policies  (including  labor,  financial  sector  and  trade  reforms,  among 
others) have had a strong positive effect on wage differentials, although that effect 
tends to fade fairly rapidly. The authors fail to find a significant effect of trade reform 
on wage differentials in their panel of countries, but they do find an impact of the 
share of technology exports, which they use as a proxy to technology adoption. They 
conclude  that  “technological  progress  rather  than  trade  has  been  the  mechanism 
through which the unequalizing effects have been operating”. Sánchez-Páramo and 
Schady (2003) reach a similar conclusion using repeated cross-sections of household 
surveys for  a  series  of  Latin American  countries. They  stress  an important  point: 
although  the  direct  effect  of  trade  on  wage  inequality  may  be  small,  trade  is  an 
important mechanism for technology transmission in Chile, Colombia and Mexico, 
although they do not have information on R&D for Argentina. 
To sum up, most of the elements from the main hypothesis behind the increase in 
inequality in many developed countries, skill-biased technological change, seems to 
be  present  and  exacerbated  in  Argentina.  First,  changes  occurred  not  only  in 
production  technologies,  but  also  in  the  way  of  organizing  economic  activity, 
including substantial changes in firm size and ownership structure. Second, unlike 
other countries where changes were introduced gradually, Argentina experienced a 
shock  in  the  way  production  was  carried  out,  due  to  the  sudden  openness  of  the 
economy. Thirdly, the overvaluation of the exchange rate and the global transition 
towards intensive use of information technologies coincided, driving the adoption of 
state of the art equipment and processes. Finally, changes occurred in a framework of 
weak labor and social institutions. It should be noted, however, that while several 
studies suggest the empirical relevance of the argument discussed in this section, there 
is no conclusive evidence on the quantitative importance of this hypothesis.
7. Adjustment, unemployment and credentialism 
Sections  5  and  6  highlighted  the  relevance  of  increased  skill  premia  for  wage 
inequality in Argentina, and discussed the relevance of trade liberalization, capital 
incorporation and technological change as plausible causes behind these changes and 
the  ensuing  increase  in  income  inequality.  Another  strand  of  the  literature  has 
emphasized the impact of macroeconomic adjustment and the resulting reduction in 
the aggregate demand for labor as central arguments for the increase in inequality in 
the  1990s.  Different  forms  of  this  line  of  reasoning  are  provided  by  Altimir  and 
Beccaria (2001), Groisman and Marshall (2005), and Maurizio (2001), among others. 
This argument states that under falling aggregate demand for labor and increasing 
supply  of  skilled  workers,  more  educated  workers  take  the  occupations  of  the 
unskilled,  which  are  displaced  to  unemployment  or  underemployment.  This 
adjustment reduces the mean wage of the skilled through a composition effect, but the 
labor market becomes even tougher for the unskilled, who lose their jobs or work 
fewer hours, hence raising inequality. The observation of higher intensity of use of Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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skilled  workers  in  production  is  then  attributed  to  this  fact,  and  not  to  higher 
productivity of that factor due to more complementary physical capital or technical 
change.  This  argument  is  linked  to  the  concept  of  “credentialism”:  the  same 
occupations are now performed by more qualified workers, although with basically 
the  same  productivity  and  with  the  same  job  characteristics  (Manacorda  and 
Robinson, 1997). The process hurts the skilled, by devaluing the return to their human 
capital, but it hurts more the unskilled, which are displaced from low qualification 
occupations. 
Maurizio (2001) presents an in-depth study of this issue. The departure point is the 
observation that during the 1990s there was an increase in the educational level of the 
labor force. Instead of relying on the presence of an increased (technology or trade-
induced) demand for this type of labor, she postulates that in a period of weak labor 
demand,  labor  markets  might  become  increasingly  competitive  as  the  supply  of 
skilled workers grow, and the latter might fill-in the occupations of the unskilled. 
Nothing  would  have  changed  about  the  production  requisites  of  the  job  –  higher 
qualifications would be required simply as an artifact of increased supply and lower
demand.  Maurizio  (2001)  develops  an  empirical  analysis  to  investigate  this 
hypothesis, by attempting to establish the degree of overeducation in the Argentine 
labor force during the 1990s, concentrating on full time wage earners. Overeducation 
is defined as the situation where a worker has an educational level higher than the one 
required by his or her occupation. Since there are no officially qualification requisites 
for  Argentina,  Maurizio  (2001)  uses  the  classification  from  the  US  Dictionary  of 
Occupational  Titles  and  compares  them  with  the  individual  qualifications.  The 
analysis finds evidence of high and increasing levels of overeducated workers, with 
22 percent of wage earners in this category in 1994 rising to 29.7 percent in 1999. 
Moreover, the paper finds that the increase in the use of qualified labor is relatively 
uniform  across  sectors,  which  is  consistent  with  the  overeducation  hypothesis  –
technical change would require differential changes reflecting skill-biases. Maurizio 
(2001) also finds that the return on “excess” years of education is only 66 percent of 
the  return  to  the  years  required  by  the  job  characteristics.  Finally,  regarding  the 
evolution of wage inequality, the findings indicate an increase in the relative wages of 
college graduates with respect to those with primary education over the period, with a 
higher premium for “non-overeducated” college graduates (that is, the ones in better 
job-qualifications  matches).  The  evidence  presented  leads  to  the  conclusion  that 
overeducation, more than technical change (trade induced or otherwise), was behind 
the  observed  trends  in  Argentina.  Groisman  and  Marshall  (2005)  also  favor  the 
credential devaluation explanation, and Altimir and Beccaria (2001) reach a similar 
conclusion, motivated by the combination of increased educational requirements and 
higher unemployment. 
Despite this evidence, the trend in overeducation cannot easily be deduced with the 
available  information,  as  workers  may  be  carrying  out  completely  different  tasks 
under a similar job description in the household survey. Based on the same EPH data,   Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
25
the  proportion  of  college  graduates  in  strictly  professional  occupations  falls  1.4 
percentage  points  between  1992  and  1997,  and  their  proportion  in  non  skilled 
occupations increases 0.6 points in the same period, which seems a relatively minor 
change. Moreover, the increase in the use of qualified labor was not uniform across 
sectors. As reported in table 4.4, the share of college graduates did not increase in 
construction, transportation or domestic servants, all sectors which are likely to have 
experienced a relatively lower technical upgrade.
This discussion does not invalidate the argument of devaluated educational credentials
which, in fact, can be considered a complement and not a substitute to the trade, 
capital  and  technology  explanations.  The  question  thus  relies  on  its  quantitative 
relevance, which might be relatively minor beyond some short periods of employment 
contraction (e.g. 1993-1996). As shown in figure 4.6, the employment rate is similar 
in the early and in the late 1990s (even for unskilled workers), despite the substantial 
reduction  which  followed  the  structural  adjustments  of  the  early  1990s  and  the
Tequila crisis. Mean hours of work were also similar in the early and late 1990s, with 
only a 1 percent fall between 1992 and 1998. In addition, real wages increased for 
skilled workers, and did not fall for other types of workers, at least between 1992 and 
1998. While unemployment did increase substantially in the 1990s, it was mostly 
driven by the rise in labor market participation (see figure 4.6). In light of these facts, 
the fall in the aggregate demand for labor does not seem to be so large. Regarding the 
following decade, unemployment levels fell significantly and the employment rate 
reached record levels by the mid-2000s, reducing the scope for overeducation and 
credentialism mechanisms. The levels of income and wage inequality, however, were
still higher in the mid-2000s than in the early 1990s. While the combination of these 
facts might undermine the quantitative relevance of the credentialism hypothesis, this 
might also be  a long  lasting,  difficult  to  revert  consequence  of  credentialism  (for 
instance, through composition changes in the labor force). The empirical evidence on 
this issue is scarce.
Other  studies  have  emphasized  the  link  between  adjustment,  unemployment  and 
inequality  by  stressing  macroeconomic  factors  rather  the  credentialism hypothesis 
(González and Menéndez, 2000; Altimir et al., 2002, Frenkel and González Rozada, 
2003; Damill et al., 2003; and Beccaria, 2006). However, as argued in section 4, the 
direct distributional effect of the increased unemployment in the 1990s seems small, 
as  it  is  mainly  accounted  by  the  raise  in  labor  market  participation.  Figure  7.1 
compares the Gini coefficient of household per capita income for all households with 
the same indicator computed by ignoring all household whose head or the spouse was 
unemployed. The  trend  in  both  inequality indices  is  remarkably similar: the large 
increase in inequality is almost the same whether considering the unemployed or not. 
Having said that, the increase in unemployment may have certainly depressed wages
for those employed, especially among the unskilled and the semi-skilled, which bore 
the largest increase in joblessness, and this might have contributed to a higher wage Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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premium and increased inequality. However, there is no systematic evidence on the 
strength of this phenomenon in Argentina. 
Recapitulating,  sections  5  and  6  discussed  the  relevance  of  trade  liberalization, 
technological change and capital upgrading as the driving forces behind the increase 
in  the  relative  demand  for  skilled  labor,  while  the  credentialism  and  adjustment 
arguments stress the negative impact of structural changes and the macroeconomic 
climate  on  the  relative  demand  for  unskilled  labor.  As  argued  above,  the  factors 
behind  these  explanations  are  not  mutually  exclusive,  and  might  even  be 
complementary. This implies that their relative merit is an empirical question, but, 
unfortunately, it is not easy to distinguish between the two sets of hypotheses with the 
data at hand. 
8. Other contributing factors
This section attempts to do justice, at least partially, to a series of relevant topics 
which were not covered by the previous discussion. The selection of topics attempts 
to highlight some of the knowledge gaps in the scholarly literature about inequality in 
Argentina. Their inclusion in this section does not necessarily imply that they are 
second order, but sometimes reflects the lack of data or difficulties for identifying 
effects. The  section  starts  by  reviewing  the  potential  inequality  effects  of  topics 
related to secular trends, such as demographic factors. It continues with the analysis of 
other  reforms  not  previously  covered,  such  as  privatizations,  decentralization  and 
labor reform. Finally, the discussion turns to unionization and the distributive impact 
of new forms of representation. 
Demographic changes
The secular trends in demographic variables in Argentina over the last decades have 
had a distributive impact that has been documented in the literature. Marchionni and 
Gasparini  (2007)  study  these  issues  by  means  of  micro-decomposition  techniques 
based on household survey data for the Greater Buenos Aires area. The results show 
that a higher average number of children in middle and low income households in the 
period  1980-1992  is  associated  to  higher  levels  of  poverty  and  inequality  in 
equivalized household income. This increase was related to both the higher number of 
members in poorer households, and to the reduction in the hours of work of spouses 
as a consequence of having more children in the household. The same study shows 
that,  instead,  household  size  decreased  for  most  income  groups in  the  1992-1998 
period,  which  resulted  in  a  minor  reduction  in  poverty,  and  negligible  effects  on 
inequality. Cruces and Galiani (2003, 2007) develop instrumental variable estimations 
based on the 1991 Census, and find a negative and significant causal effect of children 
on their mother’s labor supply for women with primary and secondary education, but 
not for those with a tertiary or university degree. This is compatible with the trends in 
Marchionni and Gasparini (2007), since a lower (higher) number of offspring should Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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have  an  overall  (un-)  equalizing  effect  by  increasing  (decreasing)  the  labor  force 
participation of women in lower income households. 
Privatizations
The 1990s were clearly the decade of reforms.  The previous sections covered the 
impact of capital account and trade liberalization. The following pages provide an 
account of the partial evidence of the distributive effects of other concurring reforms. 
The Argentine economy was characterized, until the beginning of the 1990s, by the 
presence of large state-owned enterprises, especially in the utilities, oil, minerals and 
financial sectors. While privatizations were successful in inducing more efficiency 
and  increasing  supply  in  some  of  these  sectors  (especially  in  utilities),  their
distributional impact has to be assessed on a case by case basis. An overall assessment 
is difficult since implies considering the jointly impact on (i) access, quantities and 
prices of privatized goods and services, and (ii) earnings, employment and profits in 
the industry. 
The  main  pro-poor  argument  in  favor  of  privatizations  emphasizes  the  equalizing 
benefits from increased access and supply (Ennis and Pinto, 2002; Navajas, 1999). 
Galiani et al. (2005) report that municipalities which privatized their water provision 
during  the  1990s  had  a  significant  reduction  of  about  8  percent  in  their  infant 
mortality  rates,  which  implies  important  inequality-reducing  effects  in  terms  of 
welfare. 
On the other hand, privatizations may imply higher prices on services, due to the 
removal of implicit subsidies and to finance investment, with potentially unequalizing 
consequences. Ennis and Pinto (2002) use data from the 1985-1986 and the 1996-
1997 expenditure surveys, and report that the budget shares of telecommunications, 
natural  gas  and  water  and  electricity  rose  on  average  189,  115  and  14  percent 
respectively. These  changes  were  significantly  higher  for  households  below  the 
median of the income distribution (as high as 513, 478 and 108 percent for the poorest 
decile, respectively), although it is not possible to adjust for the quality of the service 
provided  (for  instance,  the  telecommunications  industry  saw  a  large  increase  in 
quality and availability). Galiani et al. (2004) argue that large efficiency gains from 
privatizations were not translated into lower prices. While the efficiency and supply 
effects of privatization are clear, at least in some sectors, this partial evidence suggests 
that better regulation might have helped reduce prices in public utilities, and would 
probably have had an inequality reducing effect.
Privatization also affected significantly the labor market, since most of the efficiency 
gains in privatized companies were achieved through layoffs. Privatizations accounted 
for 13 percent of the change in unemployment from 1987-1990 to 1997 – layoffs 
affected as much as 67 percent of workers in the national railway company and 83 
percent in YPF, the state-owned oil company (Ennis and Pinto, 2002). Based on a 
random sample of former YPF employees, Galiani and Sturzenegger (2008) report Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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that,  at  least  for  this  company,  laid-off  workers  experienced  a  sharp  fall  in  post 
displacement earnings that go beyond the loss of seniority or firm specific human 
capital. This evidence is compatible with the presence of rents related to employment 
in state-owned companies. While their removal implied large losses for the affected 
workers, it is likely that they also represented lower welfare losses for society as a 
whole.
Decentralization
Decentralization, the process by which the central government devolves responsibility 
of service provision to the provinces, was another important component in the far-
reaching structural reforms implemented in the 1990s. While in some sectors (most 
notably  in  health  services  provision)  the  process  started  before  this  decade,  the 
transfer of health and secondary education constituted an important component of the 
reforms. From a distributive perspective, decentralization might affect human capital 
accumulation through health and educational outcomes, and it is thus related to the 
long  term  distribution  of  well  being,  beyond  considerations  on  current  income 
inequality. 
The theoretical arguments in favor of decentralization are appealing: the idea is to 
reduce the distance between the implementers and the receivers of public policies, 
with  the  purpose  of  increasing  efficiency (through  greater  local  oversight)  and  to 
better reflect the needs and preferences of the local population. Despite these motives, 
Cetrangolo  and  Gatto  (2002)  argue  that  in  Argentina  these  reforms  were  usually 
rushed with fiscal considerations in mind, mostly to balance the central government’s 
budget.  These  authors  point  out  that  devolving  without  the  corresponding  funds, 
without  ensuring  that  the  administrative  capacity  exists  at  the  receiving  end,  and 
without appropriate compensatory measures might result in deterioration in service 
delivery and in more unequal outcomes.
Since decentralization is related to the patterns of human capital accumulation, the 
available short term evidence is only partial. However, it seems to justify the concerns 
of  those  who  favored  a  more  gradual  approach  to  the  devolution  of  vital  service 
provision. Galiani et al. (2008) present a careful study of a specific decentralization 
measure, the transfer to the provinces of all secondary schools which depended on the 
central government between 1992 and 1994. Since provincial governments already 
had  secondary  schools  under  their  controls,  the  estimation  strategy  exploits  this 
variation, and finds positive and significant effects of decentralization on standardized 
tests. However, a further analysis reveals that all the gains were concentrated on richer 
municipalities: schools in poorer areas did not see any improvement in educational 
results.  This  implies  that  this  specific  decentralization  policy  increased  average 
quality, but also increased the inequality in educational outcomes. 
These results suggest that decentralization might increase quality for those who have 
the resources or the organization to make their voice heard, or in areas where capture Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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by  local  elites  is  easier  –  not  everyone  is  capable  of  taking  advantage  from 
decentralization. While it is not possible to generalize from one reform, this partial 
evidence suggests that the process of decentralization might have had an inequality 
increasing impact, albeit in the long term.
Changes in labor regulation
The area of labor regulation was targeted by the Menem administration in the early 
1990s.  It  introduced  a  sweeping  program  of  payroll  tax  reductions,  explicitly 
motivated by the belief that lower taxes would reduce unemployment and promote 
formalization of the labor market.
21 The administration considered these reductions to 
be compensatory measures, and thus mandated larger cuts for less developed areas. 
Cruces et al. (2008) exploit these cuts and their unusual size, timing and geographical 
variation.  The  payroll  tax  as  a  proportion  of  the  total  wage  bill  for  the  non 
agricultural, formal private sector fell from around 27.5 percent in 1994 to just over 
15 percent in the year 2000. However, Cruces et al. (2008) report that the reductions 
had no significant effects on levels of local employment (the purpose of the reform), 
although the reductions were partially shifted to higher wages. This limited increase in 
wages implies that the distributional effect should be minor
22, but with an ambiguous 
direction: on the one hand, poorer regions received larger cuts, so they should see the 
largest wage increases (reduction in between region inequality). On the other hand, 
the  cuts  only  benefited  formal  workers,  potentially  increasing  within-region 
inequality.
The  Menem  administration  also  introduced  a  series  of  so-called  “flexible”  wage 
contracts  (the  “modalidades  promovidas”),  which  allowed  firms  to  legally  hire 
workers with reduced entitlements (such as the reduction or the removal of severance 
payments for some categories, or rebates in social security contributions), or to make 
extensive use of trial periods and internships. While these measures certainly implied 
lower labor standards for registered workers, assessing the distributional impact of the 
reforms  is  not  evident,  since  it  is  difficult  to  isolate  their  effect  from  the 
contemporaneous trends in labor markets, marked by increasing unemployment and 
informality, and from concurrent reforms. 
Finally, there has been some discussion in the literature about the distributive impact 
of minimum wage levels and their change. The minimum wage was an important 
variable bargained over by government and unions in the inflationary 1980s because it 
                                                
21 Neffa (2005) provides  an exhaustive description  of all the  changes  introduced  in this  and other 
aspects of labor regulation in the 1989-2001 period.
22 The tax cuts, however, had a large impact on government finance. According to Rofman (1999), the 
foregone government revenue due to tax cuts during the first semester of 1999 could have financed a 
sizeable subsidy (300 pesos, equivalent to 300 US dollars – about 40 percent of the average formal 
wage at the time) to 1.35 million individuals, about two thirds of unemployed workers in urban areas at 
the time. Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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constituted a centralized device for recouping the erosion of price increases on the 
purchasing  power  of  wages.  In  that  sense,  it  is  likely  that  through  this  channel 
increases in  the minimum  wage had  an equalizing effect.  The stabilization  of the 
1990s implied a loss of relevance of the minimum wage, which was fixed in nominal 
terms at a low level from August 1993 to June 2003, and largely not binding over 
most  of  the  period.  The  minimum  wage  increased  substantially  from  July  2003, 
coinciding  with  the  recovery  of  the  economy.  Khamis  (2008)  exploits  regional 
variations in the number of workers below the minimum wage over the period 1992-
2005, and finds positive effects for informal workers for the large 1993 increase
23, 
providing some support to the hypothesis that this policy measure had an equalizing 
effect.
The partial review of the previous paragraphs shows that the distributional impact of 
labor policies and reform during the 1990s is not a settled issue. Most of the measures 
were  qualified  as  anti-labor,  and  the  increase  in  employment  and  efficiency  that 
justified them failed to materialize in many cases. However, disentangling the effect 
of each policy from that of concurrent reforms in the labor market and elsewhere 
might prove impossible. The following deals with yet another phenomenon taking 
place simultaneously in the labor market and potentially affecting the distribution of 
wages and earnings. 
Unions and the insider-outsider debate 
The labor economics literature has an ample discussion on the distributional impact of 
unions: on the one hand, they tend to compress the distribution of wages within a 
sector, but they amplify the differential between covered and uncovered workers (or 
insiders and outsiders). Moreover, theoretical models show that the unions will be 
stronger in sectors which face imperfect competition, such as natural monopolies or 
government, or which enjoy rents by other means (such as those protected by tariffs). 
The logic is that the presence of rents facilitates the collective organization of workers 
– rent sharing constitutes an attractive selective incentive.
24 Galiani and Porto (2008), 
reviewed  on  section  5  above,  develop  a  Heckscher-Ohlin  model  augmented  with 
unions, which protect unskilled workers and capture a fraction of tariff-rents.
                                                
23 While the author qualifies this finding as surprising, the problem might in fact arise from a simple 
binary  definition  of  formal  and  informal  employment.  A  gradual  perspective,  where  formal  and 
informal correspond to the extremes, might be more useful. Cases such as the  minimum wage for 
“informal” workers arise because of the particular functioning of labor markets, which are a mix of 
labor regulations (which allow, for instance, different levels of benefits and social protection for legally 
registered workers, for instance in the case of the “modalidades promovidas”), conventions (which 
imply that some benefits, for instance the 13
th wage or “aguinaldo”, are paid to many informal workers) 
and because of the working of the judiciary – a judge, for instance, will routinely grant severance 
payments  in  labor  disputes  without  taking  into  account  the  existence  of  a  written  contract  or  the 
payment of social security contributions.
24 See Card et al. (2004) for a review and for empirical evidence on the wage-equalizing effects of 
unions for the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada from the mid-1970s to the mid-2000s.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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The Argentine labor market has been characterized by the presence of strong, industry 
wide unions, which played a significant role in shaping the country’s social, economic 
and political outlook, mainly through their relation with the Peronist party. Despite 
the importance of unions in the Argentine economy, there is scant empirical evidence 
on their impact on wages and income, mostly because of data availability issues.
25
There is a broad consensus about the inequality-reducing effects of the first Perón 
government’s pro-labor policies, in which the previous (relatively scattered) unions 
were  centralized  and  greatly  strengthened.
26  From  the  1940s  to  the  1950s  union 
membership doubled, from 30 to 51-65 percent for manufacturing workers and from 
24 to 38-41 percent for non agricultural workers (Marshall, 2005). After this initial 
consolidation  of  large  unions,  it  is  highly  likely  that  unions  also  had  an  overall 
equalizing effect in the 1950-1970 period, as in more advanced economies. The low 
levels of informality and high levels of union membership warranted a large fraction 
of  beneficiaries  from  union  activities,  and  the  presence  of  high  tariffs  implied  a 
relative abundance of rents to share (and to fight for). Moreover, as discussed above, 
unions also played an important role in inflationary periods, by helping regain the 
losses in the purchasing power of wages (which are in fact temporary rents enjoyed by 
firms). 
While  consistent series  of  union  membership  are not  available
27,  the  evolution  of 
coverage  and strength  for  the 1970-1983  period  can be  deducted  from  qualitative 
sources. In broad terms, unions were only relatively weakened by the authoritarian 
governments at the beginning of the 1970s, and regained a substantial political and 
formal power with the return to democratic rule (and to a Peronist government) in 
1973.  The  military  coup  of  1976  and  the  ensuing  military  regime  of  1976-1983 
implied an important retreat of unions from the labor market, and the persecution of 
middle and low rank union representatives at the workplace. From 1984 onwards, 
with the return to democratic rule, it is possible to deduct the evolution of union 
influence from the available data on number of strikes and days lost to industrial 
action  (figures  for  1984-2006  can  be  constructed  from  Murillo,  1997,  and 
Etchemendy and Collier, 2007). These figures show a high degree of union activity 
and  volatility  during  the  1980s,  receding  greatly  from  1991 onwards,  and  then 
growing again after 2001. Union membership also declined between 1990 and 2001 
(Marshall, 2005). These trends are suggestive of a series of factors. The decline in 
union  activity  coincides  with  reforms  such  as  privatizations  (see  the  discussion 
above),  trade  liberalization  and  price  stabilization  of  the  1990s,  which  at  least  in 
                                                
25 The EPH, an otherwise fine labor force survey, has never routinely collected information on union 
membership.  This  might  be  due  to  the  political  economy  of  unions  in  Argentina,  in  which  the 
government seldom had an incentive to verify the reputedly unreliable and over-estimated self-reports 
on membership (Marshall, 2002). 
26 Gerchunoff and Llach (2003) provide good discussion and an extensive bibliography on the subject.
27 Marshall (2005) presents an informed discussion of the trend in unionization rates in Argentina in the 
period  1940-2000.  The  series  cannot  be  presented  without  this  discussion,  because  the  available 
indicators are not comparable per se.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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theory greatly reduced the power of unions. This is due to the dissipation of rents 
from inefficient state-owned enterprises, from protective tariffs and from the inflation-
induced  rents  and  subsequent  wage  bargaining (Marshall,  2002,  highlights  price 
stabilization as the loss of a common standard for collective bargaining in this period). 
Moreover, the Menem administration also tried to promote (with mixed success) a 
series of union reforms, most notably decentralized bargaining, which affected the 
power of industry-wide unions. The decline in union activity during the 1990s, thus, 
coincided with a period of rising wage inequality and with factors that according to 
the evidence reviewed contributed to this rise in wage inequality. Marshall (2002) 
puts forward a bolder claim: she hypothesizes that the increase in wage inequality 
during the 1990s can be attributed mostly to the changes in union regulation, and the 
effect of unemployment and price stabilization on unions. However, this hypothesis is 
difficult to assess with the existing data sources.
28
While these arguments apply to within industry inequality, the overall distributive 
effect  of  unions  depends  on  the  characteristics  of  union  members,  which  is  an 
empirical question. Membership premia might have equalizing effects if members are 
unskilled, low income workers, while the contrary is also possible if members are 
mostly skilled or semi-skilled. This question is particularly relevant in the context of 
the recent resurgence in union activity, which, according to Etchemendy and Collier 
(2007), originates in an alliance between the Kirchner administration (2003-2007) and 
the large unions. Etchemendy and Collier (2007) report increased bargaining power 
over this period, and a larger recovery of real wages after the 2002 devaluation among 
a relatively privileged minority of formal, unionized workers, at the expense of capital 
but also, possibly, of outsiders. The changes in fundamentals in the economy have 
also facilitated this resurgence: the new relative prices induced by the devaluation 
produced large rents for firms, especially in the initial period of overshooting (from 
export  opportunities  and  from  comparatively  low  labor  costs),  while  the  ensuing 
growth  and  inflation  revived  some  of  the  union’s  leitmotif  –  sharing  prosperity 
(receiving a share of growth) and catching up with inflation.
Table 8.1 presents a profile of union affiliates for household heads and their spouses 
in mid-2007,
29 which represent 12.1 percent of all workers among this group.
30 Union 
members are more likely to be formal (with social security coverage) wage earners, 
                                                
28 Marshall (2002) relies on indirect evidence – the sectoral variability in wages over the 1990s – since 
data on unionization by sector and its evolution is not available.
29 The source of the table is the EPPS (Encuesta de Percepción sobre Planes Sociales), which was 
carried out by CEDLAS, MORI and the World Bank in mid-2007. It contains information a nationally 
representative sample of 2500 households (heads or theirs spouses were interviewed). See Cruces and 
Rovner (2008) for more details about the survey. 
30 The relatively low levels of unionization form this survey can be explained by the difference with 
previous sources, which usually ask whether the worker has a union contribution in his or her payslip. 
The question in the EPPS asked whether the respondent was “affiliated” to a union, in the context of a 
block  of  questions  on  political  participation.  The  indicator  reflects  active  participation  rather  than 
passive membership.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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with above the median per capita household income. The union membership rate is 
four times higher in the upper third than in the lower third of the distribution of total 
household income, and it is also significantly higher among those with at least some 
tertiary or university  studies,  although this  effect  is  weaker when looking  only at
formal wage earners. Multivariate analysis of the same data (not reported) confirms 
that  union  membership  is  explained  by  formal  employment,  over  and  above  the 
impact of education, gender or other individual characteristics.
31 This evidence, while 
suggestive, cannot be taken as proof of an unequalizing effect of unions, because the 
results are based on active participation rates, and membership benefits spillover to 
passive members. They are an indication, however, that more research is needed about 
unions and the differences between the growth of formal and informal remunerations 
during the post-crisis recovery (2003-2007).
The collective action of the disenfranchised
From  the  mid-1990s,  a  new  form  of  organization  emerged,  representing  the 
“outsiders”, or in more general terms, the disenfranchised – those who traditionally 
did  not  have  union  or  political  representation.  According  to  basic  social  choice 
models,  organized  collective  action  will  usually  fail  unless  the  organizations  can 
secure selective incentives to incorporate members. Since the mid-1990s, however, 
Argentina saw the rise of organized militant groups among the unemployed and the 
extremely poor. A series of factors increased the possibilities of collective action of 
these  individuals,  but  chiefly  among  them,  according  to  Garay  (2007),  was  the 
instauration  of  the  Trabajar workfare  program  after the  Tequila  crisis.  Within  the 
program, non governmental and grassroots organization had to apply for funding for 
community projects. This peculiar mode of implementation aligned the interests of 
beneficiaries  and  provided,  through  the  program’s  cash  transfer  (allocated  by  the 
selected organizations) a selective incentive for joining and participating in organized 
activities. These groups’ activities grew quickly, and they became intermediaries and 
beneficiaries  between  local  and  national  governments.  Garay (2007)  attributes  the 
surge in Trabajar beneficiaries (from 67000 in April 2007 to nearly 200000 at the end 
of that year) to the growing power of these groups. These groups, according to this 
author, also played a vital role in the organization and implementation of the cash 
transfer  program  Programa  Jefes  y  Jefas  de  Hogar  Desocupados  (PJJHD),  the 
government’s main response to the 2001-2002 crisis. With more than 2 million PJJHD 
beneficiaries,  these  organizations  strengthened  their  power  and  gained  political 
leverage, mostly through protest and through the ability to mobilize beneficiaries. 
As far as these groups gave a voice and represented the interests of those usually 
excluded  (informal  workers,  the  extremely  poor  and  the  unemployed),  they 
                                                
31  Using  household  survey  data,  Marshall  (2005)  finds  that  the  decline  in  union  membership  for 
employed wage earners is mostly explained by employment changes against social-security entitled 
workers.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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diminished  their  exclusion  from  the  democratic  process  and  reduced  political 
inequality.  Moreover,  as  a  political  force  with  mass-mobilization  capacity,  these 
organizations also created incentives for politicians and government officials to attend 
their  needs,  and  secure  funding  for  workfare  and  cash  transfer  programs,  with 
potential inequality-reducing effects on the income distribution. 
However,  concerns  about  a  culture  of  welfare-dependence,  of  second  order  in 
situations  of  generalized  poverty such  as  the  2001-2002  crisis,  might  arise  in  the 
context of the strong growth during the recovery.
9. The distributional impact of public social policies
The previous sections analyzed the level and the evolution of inequality from the mid-
1970s to the mid-2000s in Argentina, and covered a host of potential determinants of 
the major changes observed throughout the period. The influence of the State in most 
explanations  was  pervasive  but  indirect,  operating  mainly through  major  reforms. 
This  section focuses  on  the  direct  effect  of  public  social  policies  on  the  income 
distribution.
The trends described in sections 2 and 3 referred to monetary income as reported in 
household surveys. Although this income variable includes some forms of monetary 
government transfers – mainly pensions, child-support benefits to formal workers, 
unemployment  insurance  payments,  and  cash  transfers  from  poverty-alleviation 
programs –, the bulk of the government impact on individual well-being is ignored. In 
particular, the value of all in-kind subsidies, like education or health, is not included 
in the welfare proxy used for distributional analysis (household income). The same is 
true for most of the tax system, since direct taxation has a minor role in Argentina, at 
least  when  compared  to  high  income  OECD  countries.  Moreover,  it  is  not  clear 
whether  income  reported  to  the  survey  is  net  or  gross  of  direct  taxes,  since  this 
information is not present in the EPH questionnaire, and there are no clear guidelines 
on the issue for the interviewers. It is believed that most salaried workers report their 
income net of labor taxes, since these are subtracted from their wage bills, while the 
few self-employed who pay direct taxes probably do not include them in their report 
to the survey. 
The results in this section adjust inequality measures to account for the impact of 
social  public  policies.  In  theory,  the  exercise  is  simple:  starting  with  the  original 
income  distribution  reported  in  the  survey,  cash  transfers  are subtracted  to  get  a 
“market” income distribution, and then it is necessary to add the income value of in-
kind social transfers and to subtract the burden of the tax system that finances social 
spending. The impact of the pension system is not covered: since benefits are tightly 
linked to the contributions by formal workers, it is not a redistributive policy to a 
large  extent.  Instead,  the  exercise  focuses  on  the  programs  financed  with  general 
revenues, and where the benefits are not linked to contributions. The social policies in 
the analysis include education, health, water, sanitation, poverty alleviation programs, Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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housing, employment policies, and most municipal services (e.g. lighting and garbage 
collection).  Many  of  these  policies  are  carried  out  simultaneously  at  the  federal, 
provincial  and  municipal  levels.  Public  spending  figures  in  this  section  were 
assembled  by  DGSC  (2008),  and  refer  to  consolidated  spending  of  the  three 
government levels.
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Figure 9.1 shows social public expenditures as a share of disposable income and in 
per  capita  terms  at  constant  prices.  The  pattern  has  been  erratic.  Social  spending 
progressively increased in the 1990s, but the trend was abruptly interrupted by the 
2001-2002 economic crisis. Social spending increased fast in the 2003-2006 period, 
when it reached its highest value in per capita real pesos. As depicted in figure 9.2, the 
structure of social spending has also varied in the period under analysis. The main 
change was the growth in the share of cash transfers from social assistance and labor 
programs,  which  climbed  from  15  percent  to  25  percent,  because  of  some  new 
workfare programs in the mid 1990s, and because of the implementation of very large 
emergency cash transfer programs after the 2001-2002 crisis, mainly the Programa 
Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados (PJJHD – see Moreno, 2006, for the evolution of 
these programs). 
Before proceeding to the incidence results, it is important to provide some details on 
the methodology and to establish its limitations. To carry out the distributional impact 
exercise, the budget of each program in each year is distributed across the quintiles of 
the income distribution, following the benefit-incidence results of CEDLAS (2005), 
which were based on the EPH and the Encuesta  de Condiciones de Vida (Living 
Conditions Measurement Survey-ECV), 2001. This procedure implicitly assumes that 
there are no changes in the targeting of the programs over time. The evolution of the 
distributional impact of government spending arises from changes in the allocation of 
the budget across programs. It is likely that targeting in some programs changed over 
time,  because  of  modifications  in  their  design  or  because  of  the  evolving 
socioeconomic situation of the population. For instance, there is evidence that the 
non-poor have increasingly opted out of the public system in education and health, 
thus increasing the pro-poor bias of these programs. This trend, clear in the 1990s, 
somewhat  stopped  during  the  crisis  of  2001-2002  (Gasparini,  2005b),  although  it 
seems to have returned during the subsequent period of growth.
33
                                                
32 The share of the local (provincial and municipal) level of government in social public spending 
increased over the period under analysis: 37.3 in 1980, 43.0 in 1986, 41.7 in 1991, 47.5 in 1998, 48.1 in 
2002 and 52.3 in 2006.
33 For instance, the share of children attending public schools among all the enrolled at the primary 
level was stable at 95 percent for the poorest quintile in the period 2003-2006, but the share fell from 
63 percent to 51 percent for children in the fourth quintile, and from 34 percent to 30 percent for those 
in the fifth (richest) quintile.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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Social spending is assumed to be entirely financed by the tax system.
34 Tax incidence 
results  originate  from  different  sources  (Gasparini,  1999;  Rossignuolo,  2007, 
Argañaraz et al., 2007), and the distributional incidence of each tax is assumed to 
have stayed constant over time. The changes in the incidence of the tax system in this 
section’s results arise from modifications in the tax structure, which have been far 
from  negligible  (figure  9.3).  The  VAT  and  excise  taxes  were  always  the  most 
important  source  of  revenues  for  the  government,  but  their  quantitative  relevance 
widely varied over time: in the 1980s the share in total revenues fell from 45 percent
to 30 percent, crept to 40 percent in the 1990s and has been falling again in the 2000s. 
While trade duties and taxes on the financial system were very low in some periods, 
they are keystones of the fiscal policy in  the post-crisis  years.  The weight of the 
personal income tax slightly increased over time, but its share was still lower than 10
percent in 2006. 
The  impact  of  social  spending  depends  also  on  its  size  as  a  share  of  disposable 
income.  Unfortunately,  a  comparable  disposable  income  series  since  1980  is  not 
available, and thus it is necessary to assume a constant ratio per capita disposable 
income  to  per  capita  GDP.  Fernandez  and  Kydiba  (2005)  argue  that  disposable 
income increased less than GDP in the 1990s. Hence, the distributional impact of
spending in that decade may be underestimated in the present exercise. 
The main results are summarized in table 9.1. A higher concentration index means 
more  concentration  of  spending  or  taxes  on  higher-income  people.  Concentration 
indices for social public spending (SPE) are negative, indicating a mild pro-poor bias. 
Naturally, SPE is then progressive (column iv): its distribution is less concentrated in 
the rich than the income distribution. In contrast, the tax system is slightly regressive, 
at least in this exercise where current –and not permanent– income is taken as the 
individual welfare measure.
The  targeting  of  SPE  has  been  increasing  over  time,  in  particular  since  the 
implementation of large conditional cash transfer programs in 2002. The progressivity 
of SPE has been also growing over time, fueled also by increasing income inequality: 
a given expenditure structure is more progressive if the income distribution becomes 
more unequal. 
Taxes are more concentrated in the upper income strata, as reflected by their positive 
concentration index. Tax concentration rose in the 1990s but not at the same speed as 
income concentration, turning the tax system increasingly regressive, as shown by the 
increasingly  negative  progressivity  index.  This  pattern  changed  in  the  2000s  as 
inequality started to decline after the 2001-2002 crisis, and due to significant changes 
in the tax structure, in favor of the more progressive export and financial levies. 
                                                
34 Although strong anecdotal evidence suggests that some of the funds from public spending never 
reach the intended population, because of inefficiencies and corruption, these potential leakages are 
ignored because of a lack of information on their level and trend.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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This  point  deserves  a  further  discussion.  The  government  encouraged  a  large 
devaluation of the peso in 2002, and tried to sustain a higher exchange rate in the 
ensuing period. The devaluation implied a substantial fall in real wages and hence a 
potentially large unequalizing impact. On the other hand, the real devaluation of the 
peso, along with a surge in the price of agricultural commodities, created large rents 
to land, which were extracted through progressive exports taxes through which large 
poverty-alleviation programs were financed.Therefore, the regressive devaluation was 
the  key  element  for  affording  and  building  a  substantially  more  equalizing  fiscal 
system.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  excise  duties  (or  “retenciones”)  had  another 
indirect distributive impact by keeping the local prices of traded goods below their 
international level, which was very important in a context of increasing international 
prices (the so-called  commodity price  boom).  This  effect is  not  included in  these 
calculations, but it is discussed in section 11 below. Given the opposing effects in 
play, the net distributional impact of the devaluation is difficult to estimate. 
It  can  be  shown  (Lambert,  2001)  that  the  distributional  impact  of  fiscal  policy, 
measured  as  the  difference  in  the  Gini  coefficient  after  and  before  government 
intervention, can be decomposed into two terms, since it is equal to public spending as 
share of disposable income multiplied by the progressivity of the fiscal policy (as 
measured by the sum of Kakwani’s progressivity indices of expenditures and taxes). 
Figure 9.5 shows the three elements of this equation: the distributional impact of the 
fiscal policy (i.e. the difference in the Ginis after and before), the share of SPE in total 
disposable  income,  and  the  progressivity  of  the  fiscal  policy  (the  net  index  of 
expenditure and taxes). The distributional impact of fiscal policy varied in the 1980s 
as a result of large changes in the budget size and reallocations across  programs. 
There  was  an  equalizing  trend  in  the  distributional  impact  of  fiscal  policy  in  the 
1990s, mostly due to higher progressivity of spending and taxes. After a fall in the 
distributional impact due to the 2001-2002 crisis, the series returned to an increasing 
trend. This  was due to a large increase in  the progressivity of the tax  system, as 
discussed above, and also  because of an increase  in  public spending, reaching its 
highest value in the series presented. 
Figure 9.6 shows that although fiscal policy reduces the level of inequality, it did not 
have a significant impact in affecting its pattern over the last decades. This result is 
driven by the fact that changes in the distributional impact of fiscal policy were small 
compared to inequality changes driven by “market” forces. 
It is interesting to further analyze the role of cash transfers directed to the poor. Figure 
9.7 shows the extraordinary increase of these transfers since the economic crisis of 
2001-2002. As a response to its social consequences, the government implemented a 
large emergency program (Programa Jefes de Hogar, PJJHD) that covered around 2 
million  households  (about  20  percent  of  all  households  in  the  country).  As  the 
economy recovered, the coverage of the program fell to 1.4 million beneficiaries in Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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2007.
35 The distributional impact of CCTs has been small, although not negligible – it 
accounted for a reduction of around 1 Gini point in 2006 (see figure 9.8).
10. The macroeconomic crises
Macroeconomic  crises  have  unfortunately  been  a  constant  factor  in  the  Argentine 
economy in the last 30 years. The series in figure 3.1 depict sudden and large falls in 
GDP  per  capita. Some  of  the  crises  in  fact  constitute  the  delimitations  of  the 
“episodes” in the inequality narrative presented in section 3. While the relationship is 
not a perfect fit, there seems to be a clear correlation between the evolution of GDP 
and distributional indicators during the episodes of crisis and recovery.
Understanding and accounting for crises is relevant, first and foremost, because of 
their  large  negative  effect  on  household  welfare,  which  has  been  documented 
elsewhere.
36  This  section deals  mostly with  their  effect  on  inequality.  It starts  by 
reviewing episodes of macroeconomic crisis, and then focuses on two of their salient 
aspects.  On  the  one  hand,  the  section  reviews  the  evidence  on  the  mechanisms 
determining the differential impact of crises along the income distribution. On the 
other hand, given that the large increases in inequality tend to dissipate some time 
after the crises struck, the section covers the evidence on the channels through which 
they can have a permanent effect on the shape of the income distribution.
The crises
The  fluctuations  in  output  per  capita  depicted  in  figure  3.1  reveal  a  series  of 
macroeconomic crises in Argentina since the mid 1970s. The first of the large crises 
started  in  1980/1981,  with  a  banking  crisis  in  1980  and  a  large  devaluation  and 
reversal in capital flows in 1981 following the collapse of a managed exchange rate 
system set up by the military government. The situation further deteriorated in 1982, 
when Mexico announced that it would default on its external debt. This  “external 
debt” crisis spread through the region, affecting other heavily indebted countries like 
Argentina  which  were  not  able  to  re-finance  their  short  term  obligations.  The 
devaluation  of  1981  and  the  liquidity  difficulties  of  1982  (fuelled  also  by  the 
confidence crisis after the Malvinas conflict) resulted in a fall of output of around 5
percent in each of these years. The Gini coefficient increased significantly by about 3 
points and poverty rose 2 points from 1980 to 1981. Although the Gini fell almost one 
                                                
35 The new programs Familias por la Inclusión Social and Seguro de Capacitación y Empleo gained 
relevance as  successors  to  the  PJJHD,  but the  latter  was  still the  one  with  the  highest  number  of 
beneficiaries in 2008.
36  See  for  instance  the  discussion  for  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  in  Lustig  (2000),  and  the 
comparative discussion of the impact of financial crises in the region and South-East Asia in Fallon and 
Lucas (2002).Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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point from 1981 to 1982, the poverty headcount still increased by 3 percentage points 
and rose above the 10 percent level.
The second large crisis took place in the mid-1980s, with the 1985 recession that 
preceded the Austral stabilization plan. Output fell by 9 percent and poverty increased 
2 percentage points, but as can be appreciated in figure 3.1, inequality as measured by 
the Gini coefficient fell by three points with respect to 1984. The stabilization plan 
initially managed to reduce inflation, but it accelerated again in the period 1985-1988, 
culminating  in  two  hyperinflation  episodes,  one  in  mid  1989 and  one  in  the  first 
quarter  of  1990.  Output  fell  11  percent  between  1988  and  1990,  and  the  annual 
inflation rates were 343, 3080 and 2314 percent respectively for 1988, 1989 and 1990. 
The hyperinflation crisis had a very large distributional impact: poverty increased by 
25 percentage points and the Gini coefficient by 6.3 points between 1988 and 1989, 
although it should be noted that inequality had been increasing steadily between the 
1985 stabilization and the 1989 hyperinflation-induced jump. 
In  April  1991,  the  country  adopted  a  currency  board  with  a  fixed  exchange  rate 
regime, the Convertibility plan, which managed to curb inflation successfully: yearly 
inflation fell from 172 percent in 1991 to 25 percent in 1992, and from 1993 until 
2001 it remained at single digit levels. The Convertibility plan was accompanied by a 
series  of  far-reaching  structural  reforms.  The  economy  grew  fast  after  the 
implementation of the Convertibility plan, with per capita GDP increases of about 9 
percent in 1991, 3 percent in 1992, 9 percent in 1993 and 5 percent in 1994, fuelled by 
growing public and private indebtedness from the liquidity in international capital 
markets. In December 1994, the newly elected government in Mexico let the currency 
float, which triggered a capital flight and a financial crisis that severely affected the 
Argentine economy. The currency board sustained the drain of reserves, but the so-
called “Tequila crisis” implied a fall in GDP of around 4 percent in 1995. While 
growth bounced back quickly after the contagion of the Mexican financial crisis, the 
episode had a very large  distributional  impact: poverty increased  by 5  percentage 
points and the Gini index by 2.7 points in a year. The effects of the crisis are also 
visible in the evolution of the national urban unemployment rate, which soared from 
10.7 in May 1994 to 18.4 percent in May 1995. Probably as a consequence of the 
reforms, the rate had already been increasing steadily from 6 percent in October 1991 
(the first measure before the implementation of the Convertibility plan), but it jumped 
with the Tequila crisis and remained in double digits until the second half of 2006. 
The crisis also implied a set of changes in the structure of employment, most notably 
an increase in the labor force participation of women and secondary workers
37, and 
                                                
37 For instance, the participation rate for adult women (aged 25-64) increased from 50.8 to 53.3 percent 
from 1994 to 1995, while it remained fairly stable for men in the same age group (91 to 91.3 percent). 
For the same years, the employment rate for adult women was stable at 45.1 percent, but it decreased 
from 83.5 to 80.6 percent for adult men, which is reflected in the unemployment rates increases from 
11.2  to  15.4  for  women  and  11.8  to  12.3  for  men. The  participation  rate  for  adults  over  65  also 
increased throughout the period (CEDLAS, 2008).Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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the implementation of the Plan Trabajar, a workfare program which would form the 
basis for future cash transfer initiatives. Contrary to the period after the hyperinflation 
crisis, however, inequality levels and the unemployment rate did not fall during the 
recovery. It is possible that the financial crisis acted as a catalyst that accelerated and 
amplified  the  adverse  effects  of  the  reforms.  The  crisis  happened  at  a  time  of 
increased exposure to (and dependence on) international capital flows. The economy 
as a whole was adjusting to the new economic incentives brought in by the structural 
changes, which were bound to produce large sectoral reallocations of employment. 
Households and small firms were particularly vulnerable in a context of overvalued 
exchange rate and increased competition, with almost no compensatory policies to 
ease the transition (Trabajar was implemented after the crisis, and not during the 
reforms). The Tequila crisis probably exacerbated what was going to be, in any case, a 
difficult transition. While the crisis had long lasting effects in the income distribution
(and in unemployment levels), it is likely that this was partially due to the acceleration 
and worsening of a process that was already going on.
While growth resumed fairly strongly in the 1996-1998 period, inequality only fell 
slightly. The continuing exposure to international capital flows brought about by the 
currency board regime and the liberalization of the capital account hit the economy at 
the end of the millennium, with impacts form the 1997 financial crisis in South-East 
Asia and the 1998 crisis in Russia. The latter resulted in the devaluation in January 
1999 of Brazil’s currency, Argentina’s largest trading partner. The economy entered a 
period of recession, which culminated in a major economic, banking and financial 
crisis when, in December 2001, the currency board system finally collapsed, after 
restrictions were imposed on withdrawal of funds from the banking system. GDP per 
capita fell 17 percent between 2000 and 2002, and 22 percent since the start of the 
recession in 1998. The recession and the ensuing crisis had a large impact on poverty, 
which rose 26 percentage points between 1999 and 2002, and on the Gini coefficient, 
which  increased  4  points  in  the  same  period.  The  most  dramatic  effect  was  the 
combination of increasing prices (due to the devaluation) and falling nominal incomes 
(due to  the sharp fall in economic activity), which  implied  a jump in the official 
poverty rate from 38.3 percent in October 2001 to 53 percent in May 2002. Starting in 
2003, the economy entered a recovery period, growing at very high rates (above 8 
percent per year) for the period 2003-2007 (see section 11 below for a discussion of 
this episode). 
Large macroeconomic crises: the distributive effects of hyperinflation
From the macroeconomy-distribution perspective, the two largest crises (1989 and 
2001-2002) represent the most interesting episodes over the period under study, since 
they  present  unusually  large  falls  in  GDP  and  simultaneously  large  distributional Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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impacts (table 10.1).
38 Under these two large crises,  the evolution  of poverty and 
inequality  were  dominated  by  with  the  combination  of  falling  output  and  sudden 
increases in prices, although the latter increases had different origins and dynamics.
39
Given the fiscal origin of most high inflation and hyperinflation bouts (Heymann and 
Leijonhufvud,  1995),  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  literature  concentrates  on  the 
differential  incidence  of  the  inflation  tax.
40  Inflation  constitutes  by  definition  a 
proportional  tax  on  nominal  balances,  but  its  effect  on  the  income  distribution  is 
neutral only if all households face the same inflation rate, if all households have the 
same income elasticity in their demand for money, or if they all have access to the 
same  “protection”  technologies.  Theoretical  models  find  regressive  effects  by 
assuming  that  some  workers  have  nominal  contracts  and  others  inflation-adjusted 
wages (Bulir, 1998), but indexation was a common practice at all levels in Argentina 
in the 1980s. Other approaches assume economies of scale or fixed costs in the access 
to “inflation-proof devices” (ranging from financial instruments like credit cards to 
freezers), but as noted by Sturzenegger (1997), this is not a realistic setup in countries 
like  Argentina  where  foreign  currency  was  widely  available  at  relatively  low 
transaction costs. In Sturzenegger’s (1997) model all agents have access to the same 
financial technology and use currency substitution, but even in dollarized economies 
everyday transactions must be carried out in local currency. Since the poor have a 
consumption  pattern  biased  towards  these  goods,  they  are  more  exposed  to  the 
inflation tax.
Ahumada et al. (1993) and Canavese et al. (1999) present attempts to quantify the 
distributional  effects  of  inflation  in  Argentina  from  a  tax-incidence  analysis. 
Recurring  to  similar  methodologies,  both  studies  estimate  monetary  demand 
functions,  aggregate  inflation  tax  and  seigniorage  collection,  and  a  re-weighted 
consumer  price  index  by  quintile  of  the  income  distribution  based  on  the  1987 
Household Expenditure Survey. An interesting finding from Canavese et al. (1999) is 
that,  except  for the hyperinflation episodes, quintile-specific inflation  rates  do  not 
differ significantly. However, the results indicate that inflation tax as a proportion of 
                                                
38 The recession preceding the Austral stabilization plan in 1985 was not associated to large increases 
in inequality, and, as stated above, the lasting effects of the Tequila crises cannot be disentangled from 
those of the host of reforms taking place simultaneously.
39 The devaluation in early 2002 implied a jump in the price level to accommodate the new relative 
prices of the economy. The inflation in the 2003-2007 period was moderate when compared to the 
hyperinflations of 1989 and 1991 (although increasing). It was mostly due to the growing levels of 
employment  and  to  the  adjustment  of  the  real  exchange  rate  to  its  equilibrium  level  after  the 
devaluation’s overshooting in a context of a de facto fixed exchange rate. Moreover, the export levies 
implemented in 2002 implied lower prices for agricultural goods and petrol. Contrary to the experience 
of the 1980s, government  financing through the inflationary tax did  not seem to be  a major force 
behind the changes in the price index. 
40 The review in Cruces (2000) distinguishes between the studies dealing with the impact of moderate 
and continuous inflation on the income distribution from the ones that attempt to stylize and quantify 
the effect of hyperinflationary episodes. The evidence of inequality-increasing effects of low inflation 
contexts is weak. Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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income was about twice as large for households in the first quintile over the 1980-
1990 period. The income elasticity of the money demand function, lower than one, 
seems to be the main regressive channel of the inflation. The impact of the inflation 
tax on aggregate inequality indicators
41 was comparatively small for high inflation 
periods, with increases of about 1-1.5 points of the Gini for 1980-1988 and 1990, but 
extremely large for the year 1989 – the inflation tax implied an increase of 3.4 points 
in the Gini coefficient. It should be stressed, however, that the studies mentioned in 
this section are partial in that they do not account for households’ benefits from the 
collected  tax  – Lambert’s  (2001)  idea  of  the  “net  fiscal  system”.  Although 
stabilization policies based on fiscal adjustment tend to have an inequality increasing 
impact, there is a trade-off with the elimination of the regressive inflation tax.
The  tax  incidence  analysis,  however,  is  not  the  only  alternative  to  study  the 
distributional effect of inflation. Pessino (1993), for instance, estimates Mincer wage 
equations for the EPH rounds of October 1987 and October 1989, and compares the 
returns to different factors before and after the hyperinflation episode. While returns 
to education, job seniority and self-employment rise after the event (and the changes 
are thus inequality increasing), the identification of an inflation-specific effect is hard 
to justify in a before-and-after setting. Fiszbein and Galiani (2003) propose another 
approach. They first estimate the skill premium from household survey data from 
1986 to 1999, and then analyze the correlation between the premium, inflation and 
unemployment over the same period. The second stage estimates have limited degrees 
of  freedom  because  of  the  reduced  number  of  observations,  but  the  results  still 
indicate a positive and statistically significant effect of the inflation rate in the returns 
to  schooling  for  the  skilled  and  the  semi-skilled. The  returns  of  the  skilled  also 
increase  significantly  with  aggregate  unemployment,  but  fall  with  respect  to  their 
relative unemployment rate (relative to that of the unskilled). While the estimations 
are robust to the inclusion of a polynomial to adjust for trend effects, Fiszbein and 
Galiani (2003) do not provide a causal interpretation of their results.
A  final  word  of  caution  is  necessary  regarding  the  study  of  household  surveys 
collected during hyperinflation episodes: since information is collected over a period 
of  time  (typically  one  month  for  Argentina’s  EPH),  spurious  results  might  arise 
because incomes are declared in nominal terms. For instance, an inequality-increasing 
bias  might  be  present  if  the  timing  of  the  interview  is  correlated  with  household 
income  – richer  households  might  be  are  harder  to  come  by,  and  thus  might  be 
interviewed at a latter time. A few days in a hyperinflationary episode imply large real 
differences in purchasing power, or large nominal adjustment in wages, potentially 
biasing the estimation results. 
The available evidence on the impact of hyperinflation on inequality in Argentina 
suggests a relatively large regressive (and thus inequality increasing) effect. However, 
                                                
41 Canavese et al. (1999) compute counterfactual distributions where the amount of the tax is returned 
to the households. The Gini coefficients were computed by Cruces (2000) from grouped data.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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this  impact  should  be  short  lived,  since  stabilization  programs  often  reduce  the 
inflation  tax.  This  seems  to  be  confirmed  by  the  1991-1993  trend  of  the  Gini 
coefficient (figure 3.1). The depreciation of savings and nominal financial assets is 
one of the most plausible mechanisms for lasting effects of hyperinflation crises on 
the  income  distribution.
42  The  aforementioned  tendency  to  currency  substitution, 
however, limits  the scope of this mechanism,  and unfortunately this has not been 
covered in the empirical literature for Argentina. 
Large macroeconomic crises: the distributive effects of the 2001-2002 meltdown
The crisis induced by the implosion of the currency board regime in December 2001 
was unusually virulent even by Argentine standards, and its origins and consequences 
have been extensively discussed in the literature. The following pages cover only a 
selection of the existing studies.
Using a specific survey implemented by the World Bank in the midst of the crisis 
(June and July 2002), Fiszbein et al. (2003) report that almost half of the households 
suffered a fall in nominal income, and document a change in household roles with 
respect to the labor market, with higher employment among secondary workers as a 
strategy to complement the fall in income from unemployed (or working reduced-
hours)  primary  workers.  Other  coping  strategies  reflected  in  the  survey  include 
relying on the help of family and friends, reducing consumption of non basic goods 
and switching to cheaper products. As in other crises in Latin America, the extremely 
high level of unemployment implied that school enrollment did not fall significantly 
among younger children, and only slightly among those aged 16 to 18.
43
One  key  component  of  the  crisis  was  a  large  bank  deposit  freeze  and  liquidity 
restriction, which in principle has an ambiguous direct distributional effect.
44 Halac 
and Schmukler (2004) find that the probability of having savings was positively and 
significantly  associated  with  measures  of  income  (Bebczuk,  2008,  reports  similar 
evidence for other countries in the region). Interestingly, however, the authors also 
find that, among those with savings, the less educated and those with lower incomes 
had a larger probability of being affected by the bank deposit freeze, which implies 
that the measure probably had a positive effect on inequality. 
                                                
42 Political economy considerations suggest a more subtle mechanism through which the crisis might 
have had lasting consequences on the income distribution. After a decade of high inflation and stagnant 
performance of the economy, a deep crisis such as the hyperinflation episodes might help predispose 
the electorate towards costly reforms – in Keeler’ s (1993) terms, hyperinflation might have “opened 
the window” for the “hard”, inequality-increasing structural  reforms of the 1990s. Establishing the 
relevance of this channel is however beyond the scope of this study.
43 CEDLAS (2008) reports small but positive increases in enrollment rates between 2001 and 2003 for 
virtually all age groups, from 3 to 23.
44 While no empirical analysis has attempted to link the two phenomena, it is widely believed that the 
restrictions on withdrawing cash from banks had a poverty and inequality increasing effect by starving 
the cash (or informal) economy.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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McKenzie (2004) presents a detailed analysis of the labor market responses to the 
2001-2002 crisis based on the panel structure of the EPH, which follows households 
for about a year and a half. McKenzie (2004) attributes the fall in real wages to a 
reduction in labor demand and an increase in labor supply, which implied a rise in 
unemployment. However, most of the fall in household real income can be accounted 
by the fall in real wages of individuals remaining in the same job: unemployment 
levels only rose 3 percentage points during the crisis, because they were already at 
very high levels from the 1999-2001 recession. 
Finally,  Cruces  (2005),  using  the  same  panel  feature  of  the  data,  reports  that  on 
average over the period 1995-2002 household income variability (relative to the level 
of income) was three times as large for the households in the bottom quintile than for 
those in  the upper  quintile,  and twice  as large  than for households  in  the second 
quintile. The study also finds a highly significant increase in the income variability (of 
70 percent) for households exposed to the 2001-2002 crisis.
The available evidence clearly states that the poor in Argentina were more affected by 
crises  than  the  non-poor.  However,  most  of  the  inequality-increasing  factors 
mentioned in this section tend to dissipate relatively quickly, through the increase in 
employment and income levels in the recovery periods. In the two episodes of large 
crisis,  inequality  first  jumped  but  then  fell  drastically  right  after  the  stabilization. 
There is a debate on the existence of hysteresis effects on inequality from the crises 
(Lustig,  2000),  but  there  does  not  seem  to  be definitive  empirical  evidence  for 
Argentina. While the Tequila crisis had permanent effects on the income distribution, 
it  is  likely  that  this  was  due  to  the  acceleration  of  the  negative  aspects  of  the 
underlying reform process. Moreover, any permanent effects of the 2001-2002 crisis 
are difficult to evaluate, since they are confounded with the strong recovery form 
2003 onwards. The typical argument of a permanent reduction in the stock of general 
human capital does not seem to apply in the latter case, given the aforementioned 
evidence on non-falling school enrollment.
45 However, other more subtle mechanisms 
might be in place. For instance, individuals with low levels of education, those most 
affected by unemployment, might have suffered more from the loss of firm-specific 
human  capital.  Moreover,  the  psychic  costs  of  long-term  unemployment,  which
should not be underestimated, might have impacted more heavily on the same group 
(workers  with  low  levels  of  education),  which  saw  the  greatest  increase  in 
unemployment duration during the 2001-2002 crisis.
                                                
45 It is possible that the crisis affected human capital in a permanent way through health and nutrition 
mechanisms,  although  there  is  no  systematic  evidence  on  the  subject.  See  Schady  (2005)  for  an 
analysis of the issue from Peru.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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11. The post-crisis episode
A new episode unfolded in Argentina after the peak of the crisis in 2002. The average 
annual growth rate was unprecedentedly high at 8 percent between 2003 and 2007, 
while the unemployment rate plummeted from more than 20 percent to 8 percent. 
Poverty  and  inequality  indicators  fell  continuously  during  the  same  period.  The 
growth-incidence curves in figure 11.1 are illustrative of the pro-poor growth after the 
crisis.  As  figure  11.2  shows,  inequality  fell  sharply  since  2003  to  reach  in  2006 
approximately the same level as in the second half of the 1990s, before the start of the 
1999-2001 recession and the subsequent crisis. 
The fast economic recovery was propitiated by the new structure of relative prices that 
emerged  from  the  strong  devaluation  of  the  peso  in  2002:  the  fall  in  real  wages 
increased  the  competitiveness  of  Argentina’s  products  and  deterred  imports.  New 
taxes and a default of the government’s debt obligations allowed a fiscal surplus that 
helped stabilize the economy. The social unrest and the political instability of 2001-
2002 were curbed by a new and stronger government from the traditional Peronist 
party (2002-2003), with the help of a large cash transfer program which reached an 
unprecedented coverage. Moreover, the period saw a large increase in the prices of the 
commodities  exported  by  the  country.  These  exceptional  conditions  in  the 
international markets were also a key factor in the recovery. Although most public 
policies were not significantly altered from the Peronist government that arose from 
the  crisis,  the Kirchner  administration  (2003-2007)  emphasized  the  recovery  of 
stronger labor institutions, supporting the bargaining power of unions and innovating 
in cash transfer programs. This strategy, however, might have had some limitations.
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Reasons for the fall in inequality
Several factors combined to create a scenario where inequality fell: (i) the recovery 
from the crisis 2001-2002, (ii) realignments after the devaluation of the peso, (iii) a 
strong employment expansion, (iv) productive changes after new relative prices, (v) 
slower technical upgrading, (vi) stronger labor institutions and labor policies, and (vii) 
a more extensive safety net. 
(i) As discussed in the previous section, major macroeconomic crises which seriously 
disrupt the economy are associated to large jumps in inequality. When the economic 
life returns to some level of normality, inequality always falls. Although the 2001-
2002  crisis  was  considered  one  of  the  worst  in  Argentina’s  history, by  2004  the 
economy was fully recovered, with similar levels of GDP as in pre-crisis years. Some 
of the drop in inequality after 2002 was driven by the recovery and rebuilding of 
business and economic relationships after such a large disruptive shock. 
                                                
46 There is an important caveat: this episode was ongoing at the time of writing in 2008, which implies 
that there is less empirical evidence and analysis available. The discussion is thus more speculative 
than in other sections of the document.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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(ii) After years of pegging the Argentine peso to the dollar at a clearly overvalued 
rate, in January 2002 the currency board regime was abandoned, more than trebling 
the nominal exchange rate. This dramatic devaluation implied a sudden fall in real 
wages, and hence inequality rose. As in many devaluation episodes, the full impact of 
the shock in 2002 started to dissipate as nominal wages increased, and the nominal 
exchange  rate  recovered  from  its  initial  “overshooting”.  The  increase  in  nominal 
wages originated from worker’s demands to recover part of the large real losses in 
purchasing power due to the devaluation. A substantial part of the fall in inequality 
since 2002 can be attributed to these realignments. 
(iii) The strong recovery of the economy implied a higher demand in a labor market 
with depressed real wages. The share of adults employed jumped from 35 percent in 
2001 to 43 percent in 2006. Accordingly, the unemployment rate fell from around 20 
percent in the crisis to 10 percent in 2006, a level lower than in most of the 1990s. 
This expansion in employment was surely another contributing factor to the fall in 
inequality,  through  both  the  direct  channel  of  rising  incomes  for  the  former  non-
employed, and through the wage-increasing pressures on the labor market. 
(iv) The change in relative prices due to the devaluation benefited industries intensive 
in unskilled labor (such as textiles), which had faced strong import competition under 
the previously overvalued exchange rate. For the reasons discussed in section 5, it is 
likely that the trade channel (through import substitution) also contributed to lower 
inequality.  Unfortunately,  the  evidence  on  the  distributive  effects  of  these  trade-
induced changes is fragmentary. The increase in high school graduates employment in 
the manufacturing sector reflects the presence of a partial import substitution effect 
that might be inequality reducing. The impact of trade through the export channel 
seems  to  be  more  ambiguous:  the  devaluation  and  the  surge  in  international 
commodity  prices  certainly  increased  labor  demand,  but  the  sectors  involved 
(agriculture,  mining  and  oil  production)  were  land  and  capital  intensive.  Further 
complicating  the  determination  of  their  full  distributive  impact  during  the  period,  
exports also benefited the public in general through higher tax revenue from levies, as 
discussed in section 9 above.
(v)  As  argued  in  section  6,  the  Argentine  economy in  the  1990s  experienced 
substantial  changes  in  the  organization  of  production,  in  part  because  of  the  low 
relative price of imported capital goods. In the 2000s, the rate of technology adoption 
and capital investment is believed to have been slower for a series of reasons. A large 
upgrading jump had already taken place in the previous decade. Firms also resorted 
to idle capacity after the crisis. Finally, investment might have slowed because of the 
uncertainty effects of the social unrest brought about by the crisis,  because of an 
atmosphere of distrust following the default on the country’s debt and because of 
some perceived market unfriendly signals from the government. The initially strong 
unequalizing impact of the technological shock of the 1990s should have lost strength 
over time. The literature typically finds an inequality overshooting from skill-biased 
technical  shocks  (Card  and  Di  Nardo,  2006),  as  it  takes  time  for  the  displaced Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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unskilled  workers  to  be  reallocated  in  the  economy.  This  adjustment  after  the 
productive shock was interrupted by the recession of the late 1990s and the crisis of 
the early 2000s, but it likely resumed (with renewed strength) during the recovery, 
with the ensuing equalizing consequences. 
(vi) Since 2002, the new administrations took a more active role in the labor market 
by increasing the minimum wage, mandating lump sum increases in wages (which 
compresses their distribution), taking a pro-union stance, and promoting collective 
bargaining. The minimum wage, for instance, increased more than 400 percent in the 
2003-2008 period, after being fixed in nominal terms during most of the decade in the 
1990s. However, the distributive impact of such a raise is not clear, as informality is 
over 50 percent in Argentina’s labor market, and most formal workers covered by 
labor regulations are not among the poor. The government also sent messages through 
the Ministry of Labor to promote the registration of informal workers, and reversed 
partially the fully-funded pension reform of the 1990s. It also granted a large number 
of new non contributory pensions, although this expansion in coverage was relatively 
obscure  and  with  high  transaction  costs,  which  might  have  discouraged  poorer 
potential beneficiaries. The government also implemented active policies to keep the 
prices of utilities and foodstuff low, ranging from subsidies to firms to export taxes 
over agricultural products. While export taxes that introduce a gap between domestic 
and international prices have all sorts of leakages to the non poor, and inefficiency 
costs,  in  the  short  run  they  have  an  equalizing  effect  given  the  higher  share  of 
foodstuff in the consumption bundle of the poor. In contrast, the distributional impact 
of the increasing subsidies to utilities, gas and transportation is unclear, even in the 
short run (Marchionni et al., 2008). 
(vii) Finally, as discussed above, the economic expansion and the new price structure 
improved  the  redistributive  impact  of  fiscal  policy.  Social  spending  rose,  taxes 
became  somewhat  more  progressive  (mostly  because  of  export  levies),  and  the 
increased revenues went in part to sustain a large system of pro-poor cash transfers. 
The  Programa  Jefes  y  Jefas  de  Hogar  Desocupados  (PJJHD),  which  covered  2 
million households in 2003, was still running in 2007, and new cash transfer programs 
were implemented.
47 The assessment of the direct impact (i.e. without taking into 
account adjustments in behavior) of the PJJHD on inequality depends on the chosen 
index. Since transfers are concentrated in the bottom tail of the distribution, some 
indicators  show  a  higher  impact  than  others.  While  in  2003  the  Gini  coefficient 
without cash transfers would be 1 point higher, the income ratio 10/1 would have 
increased from 38.7 to 61.3. The impact of the program lost strength as the economy 
                                                
47 In 2006 the PJJHD accounted  for just 3% of  total  social public  spending (5%  if excluding the 
pension system). Considering its large size, the program is well-targeted: 80% of beneficiaries belong 
to the poorest two quintiles of the income distribution. Although large, the program is far from being 
universal: only 22% of households in the poorest quintile receive transfer from the PJJHD. Moreover, 
the amount of the transfer was kept constant over time: while in 2003 it was 25% higher than the mean 
wage for an informal unskilled worker, in 2005 it was 20% lower. Cruces and Gasparini (2008) discuss 
cash transfer programs in Argentina from the early to the late 2000s.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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recovered, since beneficiaries left the program to work, but also because the cash 
subsidy remained fixed in nominal terms in a context of increasing inflation. In 2006,
the  income  ratio  10/1  would  have  increased  from  29.9  to  32.3  only  if  the  cash 
programs were eliminated (assuming again no changes in behavior). 
The discussion in this section, based on preliminary evidence, deserves three further 
comments. 
First,  it  is  interesting  to  notice  that the  devaluation  of  the  peso,  which  strongly 
contributed to the dramatic increase in inequality in 2002, also triggered a series of 
equalizing changes in the economy. As discussed above, there is no comprehensive 
evidence on the aggregate impact of these changes. 
Second, the fall in inequality since 2002 was mostly driven by the change in relative 
prices and the economic recovery after the devaluation. Few active policy initiatives 
since 2003 seem to be have played a large part in the fall in inequality. 
Finally,  it  is  interesting  to  notice  that  although  inequality  fell  substantially  with 
respect to the crisis levels, inequality in 2006 was not significantly different from that 
of the mid/late 1990s.  Inequality in 2006 was  not different to inequality in 1999, 
despite the fact that per capita GDP and employment were higher, labor institutions 
were stronger, and a massive cash transfer program was implemented. This rigidity is 
probably  due,  at  least  in  part,  to  the  fall  in  the  relative  productivity  of  unskilled 
workers that followed the modernization of the economy in the 1990s. Rising the 
productivity  of  this  group  implies  helping  them  share  part  of  the  fruits  of  the 
economic growth. Doing this while at the same time preparing their offspring to take 
advantage  of  a  more  modern  economy  are  probably  the  main  challenges  in 
distributive policy for Argentina.
12. Concluding remarks
This paper has described the level and evolution of inequality in Argentina from the 
mid-1970s to the mid-2000s, and has provided a review of the empirical evidence 
behind a series  of determinants of this evolution. Along the way, it has also attempted 
to pinpoint which of the contributing factors to the dynamics of inequality can be 
attributed  to  market  forces,  to  state  action,  to  socio-political  dimensions,  or  to 
different combinations of these elements. 
The evolution of an income distribution over a relatively long term is the result of 
multiple  factors  interacting  with  one  another,  which  greatly  complicates  the 
identification  of  individual  effects  –  but  which  makes  their  study  captivating.  As 
pointed out by Bourguignon et al. (2004), “the evolution of the distribution of income 
is the result of many different effects—some of them quite large—which may offset 
one  another  in  whole  or  in  part”.  For  instance,  ignoring  the  impact  on  wages  or 
employment, the reforms in the 1990s in Argentina implied greater decentralization
which might have reduced school quality in some of poorest municipalities, but the Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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increased efficiency in water supply might have reduced infant mortality in the same 
area.
Only time will tell whether the reforms implemented will have a positive impact on 
welfare through the growth channel, and whether the short term inequality-long term 
growth  trade-off  exists.  Too  many  factors  are  in  play  to  construct  clean 
counterfactuals, but the evidence on the poverty and inequality reducing effects of 
government  action  seems  to  suggest  an  excessive  increase  in  inequality  after 
macroeconomic shocks and after reforms, with real welfare costs. These costs might 
have been mitigated by the presence of ex-ante policies for coping with shocks, and 
by  building-in  compensation  and  income  smoothing  mechanisms  to  ease  the 
transitions after reforms.
Some  of  the  factors  that  account  for  these  long  term  trends  in  inequality  can  be 
attributed  to  government  acts  and  others  to  market  forces,  but  most  of  the 
distributional factors covered in this paper correspond to a mix of both that might be 
ultimately impossible to disentangle – for instance, trade liberalization corresponds to 
the operation of market forces following a change in government policy, while most 
other  changes  occur  within  the  government-set  regulations  of  an  economy.  The 
evidence,  however,  has  shown  that  government  interventions  can  have  powerful
effects on the distribution of welfare, and their role in managing and compensating 
losers during transitions must not be underestimated.
Afterthought 
At the time of publishing this article as a CEDLAS discussion paper in October 2008, 
in international financial crisis was well underway, prompting a sharp fall in world 
stock markets and  in  the price of  commodities,  hitting  the export taxes that  were 
identified as one of the main resources for the Argentine government in the last of our 
“episodes”. Moreover, the Fernández administration announced the nationalization 
of  the  pension  fund  introduced  in  the  mid-1990,  and  the  roll  back  of  the  private 
pensions system in Argentina. 
It is clearly too early to evaluate the implications of the international financial crisis 
for income distribution in Argentina, although this situation probably amplifies the 
relevance of some of the caveats expressed in section 11. In any case, it is highly 
likely that this event marks the end of what we called “the post-crisis episode”.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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Appendix: a note about the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares
The  microdata  behind  most  of  the  tables,  figures  and  estimations  in  this  paper 
originate  in  Argentina’s  main  official  household  survey  (Encuesta  Permanente  de 
Hogares, EPH), which covers only the main urban areas of the country. 
The EPH started in the 1970s as a survey for Greater Buenos Aires (GBA), which 
accounts for one third of Argentina’s population. The data was collected twice a year, 
in May and October. The sampling frame of the survey was gradually extended to 
cover all urban areas with more than 100,000 inhabitants. 
In 2008, the survey covered 31 large urban areas accounting for 70 percent of the 
Argentine urban population. Since the share of urban areas in Argentina is 87 percent, 
the sample of the EPH represents more than 60 percent of the total population of the 
country. 
During 2003, a major methodological change was implemented, including changes in 
the questionnaires and in the timing of the survey visits. The new survey (know as 
EPH Continua or EPHC) is conducted over the whole year, and the two waves (May 
and October) were replaced by aggregates representing the first and second semesters 
of the year. INDEC (the national statistical agency) also started to provide population 
weights to account for the income non-response problem. The results in this paper 
incorporate these methodological changes to provide comparable statistics.
The  EPH  has  the  limitations  of  most  periodic  household  surveys,  as  it  captures 
basically  labor  incomes  and  cash  transfers.  Although  the  EPH  includes  questions 
about income from capital, the rate of non-response and under-reporting is assessed to 
be  high  (Gasparini,  2005b;  Gasparini  et  al.,  2001).  The  survey  does  not  collect 
information on consumption or expenditure.
In  2008,  at  the  time  of  writing,  the  latest  available  dataset  corresponded  to  first 
trimester of 2007, and the latest full half-yearly wave to the second semester of 2006. 
The government’s intervention of the statistical agency led to a serious conflict, which 
included the sacking of the technical teams in charge of the EPH, and the alleged 
tampering of the consumer price index, GDP and other official data. INDEC stopped 
publishing  the  micro-data  of  the  EPH,  and  it  is  still  unclear  whether  comparable 
information was collected at all for 2007 and 2008.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH. 
Figure 2.2
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Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH. 
Figure 2.3
Density function 
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Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH. Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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Figure 2.4
Growth incidence curves 

















Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH. 
Figure 2.5
Lorenz curves 
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Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH. 
Figure 2.6
Poverty headcount ratio
Moderate official poverty line 
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Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH. 
Figure 2.8
Changes in the Gini coefficient
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and the World Bank). 
Figure 3.1
The inequality of Argentina in six episodes 
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Figure 4.1
Returns to education 





















































Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH, GBA. 
Note: Predicted values for males, 40 years old, married, 2 children.
Figure 4.2
Returns to education 












Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH, GBA. 
Note: ratio of predicted wages of a Mincer regression. Predicted values for males, 40 years old, 
married, 2 children.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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Figure 4.3
Returns to education, 1992 and 1998 
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Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH, GBA. 
Note: Predicted log wages of a Mincer regression. Predicted values for males, 40 years old, married, 2 
children.
Figure 4.4
Hours of work  
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Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH, GBA. 
Note: Predicted hours of work from a Tobit regression. Predicted values for males, 40 years old, 
married, 2 children.
Figure 4.5
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Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH, GBA. Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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Figure 5.1
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Average tariff  Skilled wage premium
Source: Galiani and Porto (2008). Note: Author’s calculations base don historical trade data and labor 
surveys (EPH). Tariff: average tariff across all 3-digit ISIC sectors, weighted by employment in each 
sector. Skilled wage premium: coefficients on the skilled dummy in different earnings regressions per 
year. See Galiani and Porto (2008) for more details.
Figure 6.1
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Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH, GBA. Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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Figure 9.1
Social public expenditures 















































































































































SPE/Yd SPE per capita
Source: own calculations based on DAGPyPS (2008).
Figure 9.2
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Source: own calculations based on official information on tax revenues. Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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Figure 9.4
Concentration and progressivity index: social spending and taxes
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Source: author´s calculations. 
Figure 9.5
























Source: author´s calculations. Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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Figure 9.6





























































































































Source: author´s calculations. 
Figure 9.7
Conditional cash transfers 
























































































































































































































































































































































































Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH.
Figure 11.2
Inequality  











































Share of deciles and income ratios 
Distribution of household per capita income
                          Income ratios
Deciles                            Centiles
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10/1 90/10 95/5 95/50 50/5 95/80
Greater Buenos Aires
1974 2.8 4.4 5.4 6.5 7.6 8.9 10.4 12.3 15.5 26.3 9.5 4.9 7.4 2.7 2.7 1.6
1980 2.2 3.7 4.7 5.8 7.0 8.4 10.0 12.5 16.5 29.2 13.0 6.4 10.7 3.2 3.3 1.7
1986 2.1 3.4 4.4 5.5 6.7 8.0 9.7 12.0 16.2 32.0 15.6 6.7 12.2 3.5 3.5 1.9
1988 1.6 2.8 4.0 5.1 6.3 7.7 9.6 12.3 16.7 34.0 21.7 9.1 17.3 3.9 4.4 2.0
1991 1.8 3.1 4.1 5.0 6.1 7.2 8.9 11.4 15.9 36.5 19.8 7.5 14.3 4.0 3.6 2.0
1992 1.9 3.1 4.2 5.1 6.3 7.7 9.3 12.1 16.6 33.7 17.6 7.8 13.5 3.9 3.4 2.0
15 main cities
1992 1.8 3.0 4.1 5.1 6.2 7.6 9.4 12.0 16.5 34.1 19.0 7.8 15.0 4.0 3.8 2.0
1993 1.7 3.0 4.1 5.2 6.4 7.9 9.6 12.3 16.6 33.1 19.9 8.1 15.5 3.7 4.2 1.9
1994 1.7 2.9 4.0 5.1 6.3 7.7 9.5 12.1 16.4 34.2 19.7 8.2 15.1 3.9 3.9 1.9
1995 1.4 2.7 3.7 4.8 6.0 7.3 9.0 11.6 16.7 36.7 25.8 9.6 20.4 4.3 4.7 2.1
1996 1.4 2.6 3.6 4.7 5.9 7.3 9.2 11.9 16.9 36.5 26.5 10.1 20.0 4.3 4.6 2.0
1997 1.4 2.6 3.6 4.7 6.0 7.3 9.2 12.0 17.2 36.1 26.7 10.5 21.5 4.4 4.9 2.1
1998 1.2 2.4 3.4 4.5 5.7 7.0 9.0 12.0 17.1 37.7 30.2 11.2 22.8 4.6 4.9 2.1
28 main cities
1998 1.3 2.4 3.4 4.5 5.6 7.1 9.0 11.9 16.9 37.8 29.9 11.1 23.0 4.6 5.0 2.1
1999 1.3 2.5 3.5 4.6 5.8 7.3 9.2 12.0 17.0 36.8 28.0 10.9 21.3 4.3 4.9 2.1
2000 1.2 2.3 3.3 4.4 5.6 7.2 9.1 12.2 17.4 37.4 32.3 11.9 24.8 4.6 5.4 2.1
2001 1.0 2.1 3.1 4.1 5.4 6.9 9.0 12.0 17.4 39.0 40.0 13.9 31.8 5.0 6.3 2.2
2002 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.1 5.4 6.8 8.7 11.6 17.2 40.3 39.4 14.3 30.5 5.2 5.9 2.3
2003 1.1 2.1 3.0 4.0 5.2 6.8 8.8 11.9 17.3 39.8 34.8 13.5 25.7 5.1 5.0 2.2
EPHC
2003-II * 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.2 6.6 8.5 11.5 16.6 41.6 40.4 13.3 28.0 5.0 5.6 2.2
2003-II  1.0 2.1 3.0 4.1 5.3 6.7 8.8 11.8 17.1 40.0 38.7 13.8 28.5 5.0 5.8 2.2
2004-I 1.2 2.3 3.3 4.2 5.4 7.0 8.9 11.8 16.8 38.0 32.7 12.2 25.7 4.7 5.4 2.2
2004-II 1.1 2.3 3.3 4.4 5.7 7.2 9.1 12.0 17.1 37.6 32.7 12.0 26.0 4.5 5.8 2.0
2005-I 1.1 2.3 3.3 4.4 5.6 7.1 9.0 11.7 16.7 38.7 34.1 12.1 26.1 4.7 5.6 2.1
2005-II 1.1 2.3 3.3 4.5 5.8 7.3 9.1 11.8 16.7 37.7 32.8 11.8 25.3 4.4 5.7 2.1
2006-I 1.2 2.4 3.5 4.6 6.0 7.5 9.4 12.2 17.0 36.1 30.9 11.4 24.1 4.2 5.7 2.0
2006-II 1.2 2.5 3.6 4.7 6.0 7.6 9.6 12.3 16.9 35.7 29.9 11.0 24.2 4.2 5.7 2.0
Share of deciles
Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH. 
* Computed using the same sample weights as before the methodological changes of 2003. 
Table 2.2
Inequality indices 
Distribution of household per capita income
 Gini Theil CV A(.5) A(1) A(2) E(0) E(2)
Greater Buenos Aires
1974 0.345 0.216 0.845 0.099 0.188 0.411 0.208 0.357
1980 0.393 0.267 0.845 0.124 0.235 0.646 0.267 0.357
1986 0.422 0.327 1.030 0.146 0.264 0.450 0.307 0.531
1988 0.456 0.375 1.103 0.170 0.311 0.545 0.373 0.609
1991 0.465 0.452 1.569 0.183 0.312 0.498 0.374 1.231
1992 0.444 0.360 1.083 0.160 0.290 0.500 0.342 0.587
15 main cities
1992 0.450 0.370 1.101 0.165 0.299 0.510 0.355 0.606
1993 0.444 0.359 1.077 0.162 0.297 0.517 0.352 0.580
1994 0.453 0.378 1.112 0.168 0.303 0.510 0.361 0.618
1995 0.481 0.430 1.205 0.190 0.340 0.569 0.416 0.726
1996 0.486 0.442 1.260 0.194 0.349 0.607 0.429 0.793
1997 0.483 0.422 1.145 0.190 0.346 0.586 0.424 0.656
1998 0.502 0.471 1.300 0.207 0.369 0.608 0.461 0.845
28 main cities
1998 0.502 0.472 1.307 0.207 0.368 0.605 0.458 0.854
1999 0.491 0.442 1.213 0.197 0.356 0.606 0.440 0.735
2000 0.504 0.464 1.231 0.208 0.377 0.646 0.474 0.757
2001 0.522 0.497 1.263 0.224 0.404 0.675 0.517 0.798
2002 0.533 0.530 1.356 0.233 0.412 0.657 0.530 0.920
2003 0.528 0.518 1.343 0.227 0.401 0.637 0.512 0.902
EPHC
2003-II * 0.541 0.656 3.355 0.250 0.422 0.668 0.548 5.628
2003-II  0.530 0.539 1.488 0.232 0.409 0.664 0.525 1.107
2004-I 0.515 0.522 1.800 0.220 0.386 0.625 0.488 1.621
2004-II 0.504 0.478 1.360 0.210 0.376 0.624 0.471 0.925
2005-I 0.511 0.497 1.384 0.216 0.383 0.635 0.483 0.957
2005-II 0.504 0.492 1.469 0.212 0.377 0.627 0.473 1.080
2006-I 0.488 0.442 1.249 0.197 0.359 0.614 0.445 0.780
2006-II 0.483 0.431 1.308 0.193 0.354 0.617 0.437 0.855
Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH. 
* Computed using the same sample weights as before the methodological changes of 2003. 
CV=coefficient of variation, A(e)=Atkinson index with parameter e, E(c)=generalized entropy 




Distribution of household per capita income
Value, standard error and confidence intervals
Value Std. Err Coef. Var. (%) Lower Upper
Greater Buenos Aires
1974 0.345 0.005 1.4 0.337 0.358
1980 0.393 0.004 1.0 0.385 0.400
1986 0.422 0.004 0.9 0.414 0.428
1988 0.456 0.003 0.7 0.449 0.463
1991 0.465 0.009 1.9 0.444 0.478
1992 0.444 0.005 1.0 0.436 0.452
15 main cities
1992 0.450 0.003 0.8 0.444 0.457
1993 0.444 0.003 0.8 0.439 0.451
1994 0.453 0.004 0.8 0.446 0.460
1995 0.481 0.003 0.6 0.476 0.488
1996 0.486 0.004 0.8 0.478 0.493
1997 0.483 0.003 0.6 0.477 0.488
1998 0.502 0.004 0.8 0.494 0.510
28 main cities
1998 0.502 0.003 0.6 0.496 0.508
1999 0.491 0.003 0.6 0.484 0.496
2000 0.504 0.003 0.5 0.498 0.509
2001 0.522 0.003 0.5 0.516 0.527
2002 0.533 0.004 0.7 0.526 0.540
2003 0.528 0.004 0.7 0.521 0.536
EPHC
2003-II * 0.541 0.009 1.6 0.526 0.561
2003-II  0.530 0.003 0.6 0.524 0.537
2004-I 0.515 0.006 1.2 0.505 0.530
2004-II 0.504 0.004 0.8 0.497 0.512
2005-I 0.511 0.004 0.8 0.503 0.518
2005-II 0.504 0.004 0.8 0.498 0.511
2006-I 0.488 0.003 0.7 0.480 0.494
2006-II 0.483 0.003 0.7 0.478 0.491
95% interval
Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH. 
Confidence intervals computed using bootstrap methods with 200 replications.




Episode 1 Episode 2 Episode 3 Episode 4 Episode 5 Episode 6
Military regime The 1980s Hyperinflation The 1990s The crisis Post-crisis
76-82 83-87 88-91 92-99 00-04 05-06
Macro situation Low growth & crisis Stagnation Crisis & recovery Growth Crisis & recovery Growth
Import competition High (not always) Low High Low
Technological change Low Low High Moderate
Labor institutions Weak Strong Weak Strong
Social protection (cash) Low Low Low Low High since 02 Moderate
Inequality Increase Stable Increase & fall Increase Increase & fall Fall
Poverty Stable Increase Increase & fall Increase Increase & fall Fall
Table 3.2






1976 -2.0%             444%             148.6                4.0               
1977 6.9%             176%             167.0                2.3               
1978 -4.5%             176%             127.3                1.9               
1979 10.2%             160%             90.4                2.1               
1980 4.2%             101%             71.3                2.3               
1981 -5.7%             104%             92.1                5.0               
1982 -5.0%             165%             217.5                3.7               
1983 3.9%             344%             205.5                3.1               
1984 2.2%             627%             189.5                3.6               
1985 -7.6%             672%             226.1                4.9               
1986 7.9%             90%             189.8                4.8               
1987 2.9%             131%             193.6                5.2               
1988 -2.6%             343%             185.5                5.7               
1989 -7.5%             3080%             295.8                7.0               
1990 -2.4%             2314%             148.8                6.0               
1991 12.7%             172%             111.6                5.3               
1992 11.9%             25%             95.7                6.7               
1993 5.9%             11%             89.8                9.6               
1994 5.8%             4%             88.4                13.1               
1995 -2.8%             3%             88.0                17.4               
1996 5.5%             0%             90.4                18.8               
1997 8.1%             1%             92.1                14.3               
1998 3.9%             1%             92.6                13.3               
1999 -3.4%             -1%             95.8                14.4               
2000 -0.8%             -1%             100.0                14.7               
2001 -4.4%             -1%             103.9                19.0               
2002 -10.9%             26%             257.0                18.8               
2003 8.8%             13%             219.4                16.7               
2004 9.0%             4%             217.4                13.6               
2005 9.2%             10%             203.6                11.2               
2006 8.0%             7%             208.3                10.6               
Source: World Development Indicators and 




Changes in the Gini coefficient between periods, actual and simulated
Actual       Returns to  education on Gender  Unobservables Employment Education Rest 
Change Wages Worked hours wage gap
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
1980 - 1986
    Hourly wages -1.5 -2.2 0.7 -2.8 1.1 1.7
    Earnings 0.7 -1.4 0.0 1.0 -1.6 0.2 1.3 1.3
    Equivalized Income 3.1 -2.1 0.5 0.0 -1.6 -0.1 0.6 5.7
1986 - 1992
    Hourly wages -2.5 -1.6 -0.6 0.5 0.0 -0.8
    Earnings -1.7 -1.1 -0.4 -1.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.4
    Equivalized Income 0.7 -0.9 1.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0
1992 - 1998
    Hourly wages 5.5 3.0 -0.4 2.6 0.8 -0.5
    Earnings 7.1 2.3 2.5 -0.5 1.8 -0.1 0.8 0.1
    Equivalized Income 8.4 2.7 1.9 0.0 1.5 0.2 0.7 1.4
1998 - 2006
    Hourly wages -1.1 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.6 -2.6
    Earnings -1.5 0.1 -1.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 -2.0
    Equivalized Income -1.7 -0.9 0.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.5 -1.4
Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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Table 4.2
Share in labor, by educational group
Greater Buenos Aires
Shares in adult population
Educational group 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2006
Less than high school 78.6       74.2       68.9       62.9       57.7       47.1      
High school graduates 17.6       20.7       23.7       27.5       30.6       37.0      
College graduates 3.8         5.1         7.4         9.6         11.8       15.9      
Total 100.0     100.0     100.0     100.0     100.0     100.0    
Shares in employment
Educational group 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2006
Less than high school 76.3       71.4       66.1       60.7       54.1       45.7      
High school graduates 18.5       21.5       24.0       27.8       30.7       35.5      
College graduates 5.2         7.1         9.9         11.5       15.2       18.8      
Total 100.0     100.0     100.0     100.0     100.0     100.0    
Shares in aggregate labor input
Educational group 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2006
Less than high school 67.3       63.5       55.7       46.4       39.0       31.8      
High school graduates 22.6       25.0       29.7       32.5       32.8       37.5      
College graduates 10.0       11.5       14.5       21.1       28.2       30.7      
Total 100.0     100.0     100.0     100.0     100.0     100.0    
Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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Table 4.3
Share in aggregate labor, by sector
Greater Buenos Aires
All workers
Sector of activity 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2006
Low-tech manufacturing industries 14.8 10.9 10.6 9.1 6.4 7.8
Medium and high-tech manufacturing 23.8 20.3 18.1 14.7 12.4 8.8
Construction 6.7 9.4 6.1 4.5 5.5 6.8
Wholesale and retail 16.5 17.4 19.1 18.9 19.4 22.2
Communications, transportation and utilities 9.1 8.2 7.1 8.8 10.6 8.6
Professional and business services 6.3 8.9 10.9 10.6 13.7 13.0
Public administration, education and welfare 14.8 16.3 15.6 24.6 25.1 27.4
Other unskilled services 8.0 8.6 12.5 8.8 6.9 5.4
Total 100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0   
Less than high school
Sector of activity 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2006
Low-tech manufacturing industries 17.3 12.5 13.9 13.3 10.1 12.4
Medium and high-tech manufacturing 25.3 21.1 19.0 17.5 15.4 8.8
Construction 7.8 12.0 8.7 6.9 10.4 13.6
Wholesale and retail 18.0 19.7 20.7 20.4 21.6 27.1
Communications, transportation and utilities 10.7 10.2 7.9 10.5 13.8 11.5
Professional and business services 2.4 2.6 3.2 3.6 4.4 5.0
Public administration, education and welfare 8.4 9.6 8.9 12.6 11.8 10.1
Other unskilled services 10.2 12.3 17.6 15.1 12.5 11.5
Total 100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0   
High school graduates
Sector of activity 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2006
Low-tech manufacturing industries 10.7 9.4 8.1 7.4 5.9 8.2
Medium and high-tech manufacturing 25.1 22.0 18.7 14.3 13.2 10.3
Construction 3.8 4.7 2.5 3.2 3.6 5.9
Wholesale and retail 17.2 17.8 21.6 23.6 25.6 26.4
Communications, transportation and utilities 6.1 5.4 7.3 8.9 12.0 10.7
Professional and business services 14.0 15.7 17.7 15.1 15.7 13.1
Public administration, education and welfare 18.4 22.2 17.0 22.7 18.9 21.3
Other unskilled services 4.6 2.7 7.1 4.9 5.0 4.1
Total 100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0   
College graduates
Sector of activity 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2006
Low-tech manufacturing industries 7.3 5.5 3.2 2.5 2.0 2.4
Medium and high-tech manufacturing 11.0 12.2 13.2 9.2 7.2 7.0
Construction 5.7 5.6 3.4 1.3 0.9 1.0
Wholesale and retail 4.9 3.3 8.0 8.5 9.2 12.0
Communications, transportation and utilities 4.9 2.7 3.4 4.8 4.3 2.9
Professional and business services 15.3 28.6 26.5 19.0 24.1 21.3
Public administration, education and welfare 49.5 41.0 38.6 53.9 50.8 52.8
Other unskilled services 1.3 1.0 3.7 0.9 1.4 0.6
Total 100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0   
Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH.
Table 4.4
Share in aggregate labor, by educational group and sector
   Less than high school      High school graduates       College graduates
Sector of activity 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2006 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2006 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2006
Low tech manufacturing 78.7 72.7 72.9 67.8 61.2 50.7 16.4 21.5 22.6 26.5 30.0 39.9 4.9    5.8    4.4    5.7    8.8    9.4   
Basic and high tech manufacturing 71.4 66.0 58.7 55.2 48.6 31.6 23.9 27.1 30.7 31.6 35.0 43.8 4.7    6.9    10.6 13.2 16.4 24.6
Construction 78.6 80.7 79.7 71.1 74.0 63.2 12.9 12.5 12.1 22.7 21.4 32.3 8.6    6.9    8.2    6.2    4.5    4.5   
Wholesale and retail trade 73.4 72.2 60.3 50.0 43.5 38.8 23.6 25.6 33.6 40.5 43.2 44.7 3.0    2.2    6.1    9.4    13.3 16.6
Communications, transport and utilities 79.3 79.6 62.3 55.7 51.1 42.8 15.3 16.7 30.6 32.9 37.4 46.9 5.4    3.8    7.0    11.5 11.5 10.3
Professional and business services 25.7 18.6 16.5 15.8 12.5 12.1 50.0 44.4 48.2 46.4 37.8 37.6 24.3 37.1 35.3 37.9 49.7 50.3
Public administration, education and welfare 38.1 37.3 31.7 23.7 18.3 11.7 28.2 34.0 32.4 30.0 24.7 29.1 33.6 28.7 35.9 46.3 57.0 59.2
Other services 85.3 90.7 78.9 79.8 70.3 67.7 13.1 8.0    16.9 18.0 23.8 28.7 1.7    1.3    4.3    2.3    5.8    3.6   
Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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Table 4.5
Sectoral decompositions of changes in labor 
Between
74-80 80-86 86-92 92-98 98-06
Less than high school -1.6 -0.5 -3.8 -1.9 -0.3
High school graduates 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.6 -0.2
College graduates 1.1 0.2 3.0 1.3 0.6
Within
74-80 80-86 86-92 92-98 98-06
Less than high school -2.2 -7.3 -5.6 -5.4 -6.9
High school graduates 1.8 4.4 2.0 -0.3 4.9
College graduates 0.4 2.9 3.6 5.7 2.0
Overall
74-80 80-86 86-92 92-98 98-06
Less than high school -3.8 -7.8 -9.4 -7.3 -7.3
High school graduates 2.4 4.7 2.8 0.3 4.7
College graduates 1.4 3.1 6.6 7.0 2.6
Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH.
Table 6.1
Models of Skill Premia for High-School Graduates
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of the real hourly wage of the main occupation
Estimation at the individual level (males and females aged 18 to 65, with positive wage 
earnings)
Manufacturing Sector, Argentina, 1991-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Without a high-school degree -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.008*** -0.006***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
High-School Graduates -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 0.003 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
College Graduates 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.025*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Import Penetration No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exports No No No No No
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 34,091 34,091 34,091 34,091 32,238
Source: Acosta and Gasparini (2007).
Note 1: * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level.
Note 2: The regression also includes demographic controls (education, age, and gender) 
interacted with yearly indicators, as well as year, industry, and regional fixed effects.
Note 2: Robust Huber-White standard errors in parenthesis (clustering by industry). 
Note 3: Control variables in Column (4) are lagged one period, while control variables in 
Column (5) are lagged two periods.Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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Table 6.2
Model of change in the share of skilled labor, 92-96 
(1) (2)
DLog (ST/L)  0.629 0.673
[0.198]*** [0.194]***
Share of skilled labor 1992  -0.065
[0.022]***
Constant  1.798 2.997
[0.231]*** [0.408]***
IV Digit Industry Dummies  Yes Yes
Observations  975 975
R-squared  0.15 0.17
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
ST/L=spending in technology per worker 
Regressions at the firm level. 
Source: Bustos (2006) based on technology survey (ETIA). 
Table 8.1
Profile of active union affiliate and non affiliate workers, and participation rates 







Formal 81.8% 38.0% 43.5%
Wage earner 83.3% 41.9% 47.1%
Public employee 36.0% 10.2% 13.3%
Men 60.0% 48.8% 50.2%
Age 45.0 44.1 44.2
Rural area 23.2% 23.8% 23.7%
Below median p.c. income 31.4% 48.2% 46.2%
Basic needs deficit 11.0% 16.5% 15.9%
Woman head of household 40.8% 53.0% 51.5%








All 12.1% 20.4% 26.9%
By total household income level
Below 750 $AR (31% of households) 4.9% 6.6% 8.6%
Between 750 and 1500 $AR (37% of households) 9.3% 13.9% 18.6%
Above 1500 $AR (32% of households) 19.6% 33.7% 36.8%
By education level
Up to complete primary school 11.0% 23.5% 36.0%
Secondary school (complete or incomplete) 10.1% 15.3% 20.8%
Some tertiary or university studies 17.5% 24.9% 28.1%
Individual and household characteristics for workers
Unionization rates
Source: Own calculations based on the Encuesta de Percepción de Programas Sociales (see Cruces and Rovner, 
2008).Inequality in Argentina – CEDLAS
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Table 9.1
The distributional impact of social spending 
          Kakwani progressivity index Redistributive
   Concentration index SPE Taxes Total impact Gini-post
SPE Taxes Gini-pre (iii)-(i) (ii)-(iii) (iv)+(v) SPE/Yd (vi)*(vii) (iii)-(viii)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
1980 -0.144 0.361 0.391 0.535 -0.030 0.505 0.149 0.075 0.316
1981 -0.120 0.356 0.428 0.549 -0.072 0.476 0.143 0.068 0.360
1982 -0.116 0.362 0.421 0.537 -0.060 0.477 0.098 0.047 0.374
1983 -0.130 0.363 0.431 0.561 -0.068 0.493 0.118 0.058 0.373
1984 -0.131 0.351 0.440 0.572 -0.089 0.483 0.135 0.065 0.375
1985 -0.131 0.369 0.410 0.541 -0.040 0.501 0.141 0.070 0.339
1986 -0.139 0.366 0.420 0.559 -0.054 0.505 0.158 0.080 0.340
1987 -0.129 0.371 0.445 0.574 -0.074 0.500 0.168 0.084 0.361
1988 -0.115 0.374 0.454 0.569 -0.080 0.489 0.143 0.070 0.384
1989 -0.129 0.405 0.516 0.646 -0.111 0.534 0.126 0.068 0.449
1990 -0.115 0.376 0.462 0.577 -0.087 0.491 0.137 0.067 0.395
1991 -0.129 0.367 0.463 0.593 -0.096 0.496 0.147 0.073 0.390
1992 -0.122 0.340 0.452 0.574 -0.112 0.462 0.151 0.070 0.382
1993 -0.129 0.344 0.446 0.575 -0.102 0.473 0.169 0.080 0.366
1994 -0.133 0.350 0.455 0.588 -0.105 0.483 0.173 0.083 0.371
1995 -0.129 0.353 0.483 0.612 -0.130 0.482 0.168 0.081 0.402
1996 -0.135 0.358 0.487 0.622 -0.129 0.493 0.157 0.077 0.410
1997 -0.141 0.356 0.485 0.626 -0.129 0.497 0.160 0.080 0.405
1998 -0.138 0.362 0.504 0.642 -0.141 0.501 0.166 0.083 0.421
1999 -0.140 0.368 0.493 0.634 -0.125 0.509 0.184 0.094 0.400
2000 -0.142 0.379 0.507 0.648 -0.128 0.521 0.178 0.093 0.414
2001 -0.145 0.384 0.525 0.670 -0.141 0.529 0.188 0.099 0.425
2002 -0.172 0.391 0.554 0.725 -0.163 0.563 0.148 0.083 0.471
2003 -0.182 0.400 0.544 0.725 -0.144 0.582 0.141 0.082 0.461
2004 -0.175 0.390 0.518 0.693 -0.128 0.565 0.146 0.083 0.435
2005 -0.171 0.393 0.512 0.683 -0.119 0.564 0.158 0.089 0.423
2006 -0.165 0.392 0.493 0.659 -0.101 0.558 0.171 0.095 0.398
Source: own calculations based on various sources (see text).
Table 10.1
Macroeconomic crisis 
Changes in output, poverty and inequality
Changes
Crisis Output Poverty Inequality
1982 -5% 3 -0.7
1985 -9% 2 -3
1989 -11% 25 6.3
1995 -4% 5 2.7
2002 -17% 24 3.6
Source: own calculations based on National Accounts and EPH.SERIE DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO DEL CEDLAS
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